Case Digest: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

G.R. No. 133495                03 September 1998

Doctrine:  It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to apply.

FACTS:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja.  On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995.  On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years.  On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections.  However, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:  Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:

No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.  The purposes of said limitation are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of enhancing the freedom of the choice of people.  Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.  To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.

Case Digest: SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO

SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO., INC. and ARTURO LUMANLAN, SR. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

No. L-22766        30 August 1968

Fernando, J.

FACTS:

On June 1960, Congress amended the Public Service Act, one of the changes introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for public services owned and operated by government entities or government-owned or controlled corporations, but at the same time affirming its power of regulation for the fixing of rates.  The petitioners challenged the validity of the said order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission.

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court held in a previous case that governmental affairs do not lose their government character by being delegated to the municipal governments.  Whatever privilege may be claimed by the petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal of the Congress.

Reviewer: Constitutional Law II

It's finals period again!


Sharing this simple Consti 2 reviewer. 


Download it HERE.

Case Digest: Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and Guillermo Carague

No. L-79974        December 17, 1987

En Banc

FACTS:

When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:  Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16, Article VII.

RULING:

Mison’s appointment is constitutional.  Sec. 16, Article VII states that:

“Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x”

It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA.  Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA.  In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. 

Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that “Sec. 601. – x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.”

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396                03 May 2006                              Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same.  She did so citing the following bases:

• The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
• Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.  It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

• February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
• February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20^th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
• February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.  Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.  The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.  However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
• The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

• Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20^th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
• Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
• Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1. The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.  During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  An otherwise moot case may still be decided “provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance” (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so.  As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily.  It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.  Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, the “acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.  The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.  A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in one’s presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge – both of which are not present in David’s warrantless arrest.  This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”  Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing.   In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Case Digest: Jose A. Angara vs. The Electoral Commission, et. al.

FACTS:

In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas.  The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office.  A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner.  The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; and
2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.

RULING:

1. The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.  Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent.  The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.  The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.  This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
2. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua.  The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

Case Digest: Mariano vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118627                7 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”).  Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1.       Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions

2.       Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X   and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

3.       Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:

1.       Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

               Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.  


Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.  It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs.  It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.  Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

2.       Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

     Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

                This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events.  Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.  Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

3.       Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.  As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

Case Digest: Tobias vs. Abalos

G.R.No. L-114785             08 December 1994

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.  The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.  Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Montejo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118702                16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

	Census 1990	Census 1994
First District	303, 349	178, 688
Second District	272, 167	156, 462
Third District	214, 499	125, 763
Fourth District	269, 347	155, 995
Fifth District	309, 148	181, 242

ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one.  Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.  Section 1 is then annulled and set aside.  The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.