Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS

G.R. No. 141471.              September 18, 2000

Facts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA.  Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner.  This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed.  Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. 

After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike.  After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination.  The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining.  As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith.  Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA.  Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.  Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table.  While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.  Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment.  When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

Case Digest: Mylene Carvajal vs. Luzon Development Bank and/or Oscar Ramirez

G.R. No. 186169                01 August 2012

FACTS:

Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon Development Bank (Bank) under a six-month probationary employment contract.  Ramirez is the President and CEO of the Bank.  A month into her employment, she was send a Memorandum directing her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for her eight tardiness on November 2003.  A second Memorandum was sent to her on January for her again chronic tardiness on December 2003.  She submitted her written explanations for both events and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions.  She was terminated for three days effective 21 January 2004.  However, on 22 January, her termination was lifted but at the same time, her services were terminated.  In the respondents’ position paper to the LA, they explained that the reasons for her absence are chronic tardiness, absenteeism and failure to perform satisfactorily as a probationary employee.

LA Decision: The petitioner was illegally dismissed because she was not afforded the notice in writing informing her of what the Bank would like to bring out to her for the latter to answer in writing.

NLRC Decision: NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

CA Decision: The CA found that the petitioner was not entitled to backwages because she was rightfully dismissed for failure to meet the employment standards.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner can be considered a regular employee at the time of her dismissal.

HELD:

No. Carvajal’s appointment letter reads that “Possible extension of this contract will depend on the job requirements of the Bank and your overall performance.  Performance review will be conducted before possible renewal can take effect.”  Therefore, petitioner knew, at the time of her engagement, that she must comply with the standards set forth by respondent and perform satisfactorily in order to attain regular status.  Even the NLRC upheld the petitoner’s probationary status, stating that reinstatement is not synonymous to regularization.

Although probationary employees also enjoy security of tenure, he may still be terminated because of just and authorized causes of termination and the additional ground under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e. the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance to the reasonable standards set by the employer.  Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector.  This, together with absenteeism, underperformance and mistake in clearing a check are infractions that cannot be tantamount to satisfactory standards.

In addition to the abovementioned, it has been previously held in PDI vs. Magtibay, Jr., that the second requirement under Article 281 does not require notice and hearing.  Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known to him at the time of his engagement.  By the very nature of probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and continuous scrutiny by his supervisors.  If termination is for cause, it may be done at anytime during the probation. 

Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99         19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.  After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary.  Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal.  The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case. 

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day  The Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied.  Despite said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.  Due to the loss of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals.  Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives.  The letters specifically cited the Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts.  The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.  On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.  The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.       Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2.       Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.

HELD:

1.    Yes.  The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.  Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.  Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila.  It is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.  A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code.  These requisites were not complied with by the Union.  Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members are bound to.  To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend DOLE hearings.  The Union members should know from common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses.  In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.

Case Digest: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913                08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as guidance counselor.  In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.

They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and premature.  They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required under the law.  In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed evident bad faith. 

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.  Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.  It further held that the Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.  The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents.  However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September 2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA.  It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law.  In so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.  Petitioner’s intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to the deadline set by law.  The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause to the school’d operation is only trivial. 
2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March 2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos.  The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not timely comply with the requirements set by law.

Case Digest: Northwestern University, Inc. vs. Arquillo

02 August 2005
Ponente: Panganiban, J.


FACTS:


Ben A. Nicolas, in behalf of Northwestern University, filed a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines allegedly reporting that Atty. Macario Arquillo had engaged in conflicting interest by acting as counsel for both complainant and respondent in the very same consolidated case filed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Respondent claims that there is no conflict-of-interests as all parties are said to be on the same side.


For failing to appear in scheduled hearings, Atty. Arquillo is deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.


ISSUE:


Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:


Yes. 


 The Court held that Atty. Arquillo is guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Therefore, a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests without the written consent of all parties involved, after disclosure of the facts. The Court did not agree with Arquillo’s justification of his acts for he should have known that in representing opposing parties, there would be an obvious conflict of interest, regardless of his belief that both parties are on the same side.


Atty. Macario Arquillo was found guilty of misconduct and was hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.