Case Digest: Bengzon vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 103524                15 April 1992

FACTS:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797.  Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos.  The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege.  President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).

ISSUES:

1. 1.       Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act; and
2. 2.       Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary

RULING:

1. 1.       The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power.  But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise.  The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.  It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.  What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
2. 
   
3. 2.       Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary.  The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.  The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld.  Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law.  It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints.  The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

Case Digest: Ichong, et. al. vs. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento

FACTS:

R.A. No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed that nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S. citizens and juridical entities.  Aliens are required to present registration to the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and
2. Whether the provisions of the Act violates the due process of law

RULING:

1. There is no merit in this contention.  The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations.  The Treaty of Amity between China and the Philippines guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country,” and is therefore not violated for all nationals except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
2. A cursory study of the provisions of the law show that it is reasonable as it is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives.  Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not in its reasonableness but its unreasonableness and the Court found that these provisions are not unreasonable.

Case Digest: Jose A. Angara vs. The Electoral Commission, et. al.

FACTS:

In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas.  The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office.  A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner.  The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; and
2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.

RULING:

1. The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.  Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent.  The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.  The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.  This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
2. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua.  The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

Case Digest: Brillantes, Jr. vs. Yorac

G.R. No. 93867                  18 December 1990           Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chariman Davide.  The petitioner argues that the choice of the Acting Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC.  It is also averred that the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”  Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.  Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.  The choice of temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.  That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President.   The designation by the President of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is declared unconstitutional.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Isaias Castillo y Completo

G.R. No. 172695 29 June 2007

FACTS:

In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave the house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a nail.”

ISSUE: 

Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental

RULING:

The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot be appreciated in favour of the accused.

Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Where are the Digests?

Some of you may be wondering where I have placed all of those case digests that can be seen from http://reenfab.wordpress.com.  They're still here.  It's just that I've been recently using these for a project of my own due on October.  So don't you worry.  Once the project is done, I'll place these digests and more back up for your reference. :)

For now, I have placed in some of the other case digests that I'm not using at the moment.

Case Digest: Chavez vs. National Housing Authority

G.R. No. 164527                                                August 15, 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS:

On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.

On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161 approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan Manila Waste Management Plan.  During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo, Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.

As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came into place.  RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects.  Thereafter, Aquino proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others.  The same MO also established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively, to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).

Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process.  Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI. 

Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site.  RBI is expected to fully finance the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay Area.  The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components.  If the project is revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.

To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II.  Phase I of the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled site.  Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.

Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended and 

restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the project.  The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to 2,992.  The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos.  The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.

Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary.   On August 1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.

On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements.  During this time, NHA reported that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over by RBI. 

ISSUES:

1.       Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed by petitioner;

2.       Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to reclaim foreshore and submerged lands;

3.       Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man;

4.       Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that said lands are no longer needed for public use;

5.       Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands;

6.       Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding;

7.       Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands of public domain;

8.       Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP; and

9.       Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position

 HELD:

1

.       Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National Government.  This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all.  The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).

2.       Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project.  ECCs and Special Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision over the project.  Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that originally authorized the reclamation.  It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.

3.       The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.

4.       Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be “disposed to qualified beneficiaries.”  Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.

5.       Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.

6.       There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project.  It was noted that notices were published in national newspapers.  The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards Committee on May 18, 1992.

7.       RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same.  In addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.

8.       This relief must be granted.  It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution.

9.       When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of MOA between RBI and NHA.  The properties and rights in question after the passage of around 10 years from the start of the project’s implementation cannot be disturbed or questioned.  The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so.  The moment to challenge has passed.

Reviewer: Aggravating Circumstances

Sharing with you a reviewer that I made on Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

Download it here.

Case Digest: Mariano vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118627                7 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Juanito Mariano, a resident of Makati, along with residents of Taguig suing as taxpayers, assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 of R.A. No. 7854 (“An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati”).  Another petition which contends the unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7854 was also filed by John H. Osmena as a senator, taxpayer and concerned citizen.

ISSUES:

1.       Whether Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati violating sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code on specifying metes and bounds with technical descriptions

2.       Whether Section 51, Article X of R.A. No. 7854 collides with Section 8, Article X   and Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution stressing that they new city’s acquisition of a new corporate existence will allow the incumbent mayor to extend his term to more than two executive terms as allowed by the Constitution

3.       Whether the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional as the reapportionment cannot be made by a special law

HELD/RULING:

1.       Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 states that:

Sec. 2. The City of Makati. — The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.

               Emphasis has been provided in the provision under dispute.  


Said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality.  It must be noted that the requirement of metes and bounds was meant merely as a tool in the establishment of LGUs.  It is not an end in itself.

Furthermore, at the time of consideration or R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation.  Out of becoming a sense of respect to co-equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.

2.       Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 provides that:

Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. — The represent elective officials of the Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City of Makati.

     Section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the Constitution provide the following:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election.

No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

                This challenge on the controversy cannot be entertained as the premise on the issue is on the occurrence of many contingent events.  Considering that these events may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.  Moreover, only Mariano among the petitioners is a resident of Taguig and are not the proper parties to raise this abstract issue.

3.       Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution clearly provides that the Congress may be comprised of not more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise provided by law.  As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law.

Case Digest: Tobias vs. Abalos

G.R.No. L-114785             08 December 1994

PONENTE: BIDIN, J.

FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.  A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.  The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion.  Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7, 911” voted “no”.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING:

For the purposes of discussion, let’s breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion.  Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one-title-one-subject” rule has been liberally adopted by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise provided by law.  The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment.  Therefore, the increase in congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Montejo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118702                16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

	Census 1990	Census 1994
First District	303, 349	178, 688
Second District	272, 167	156, 462
Third District	214, 499	125, 763
Fourth District	269, 347	155, 995
Fifth District	309, 148	181, 242

ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one.  Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.  Section 1 is then annulled and set aside.  The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.

Confusing Concepts: Initiative vs. Referendum

The difference between an initiative and referendum is oftentimes a subject of confusion.  This difference has been further discussed in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.  The below overview has been provided for the purposes of simple elaboration.


In the enactment of Sec. 3, Republic Act 6735,  "Initiative and Referendum Act," the difference between one term from the other is discussed.

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

x x x

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.

(Emphasis has been supplied.)

It has also been noted by Justice Isagani Cruz that in most cases when a referendum would become a law if there is no action on the provided by the electors.


The table below also provides a head-to-head difference of the two concepts.

	Initiative	Referendum
Initial Source	The people	The Congress
Congress intervention?	No	Yes
Nature	Proposal by the people	Approval or rejection by the people
Scope	Amendments only	Amendments and revision