Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS

G.R. No. 141471.              September 18, 2000

Facts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA.  Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner.  This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed.  Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. 

After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike.  After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination.  The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining.  As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith.  Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA.  Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.  Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table.  While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.  Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment.  When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

Case Digest: Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211

15 September 1989

En Banc

FACTS:

After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile.  Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.  But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: 

Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned.

RULING:

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of the “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.  Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.  It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common good.  The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396                03 May 2006                              Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same.  She did so citing the following bases:

• The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
• Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.  It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

• February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
• February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20^th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
• February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.  Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.  The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.  However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
• The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

• Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20^th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
• Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
• Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1. The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.  During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  An otherwise moot case may still be decided “provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance” (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so.  As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily.  It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.  Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, the “acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.  The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.  A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in one’s presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge – both of which are not present in David’s warrantless arrest.  This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”  Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing.   In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ruben Ayson and Felipe Ramos

07 July 1989                   

G.R. No. 85215

 

Ponente: Narvasa, J.

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.  The PAL manager sent him a letter regarding his involvement on the irregularities of the sales of plane tickets, wherein an investigation is to be made on 09 February 1986.  The day before the said investigation, Ramos sent a handwritten note to his superiors stating that he is willing to settle the said irregularities of approximately Php76,000.00.

In the said investigation done by the PAL Baguio Branch Manager, Edgardo Cruz in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Ramos agreed that his answers be taken down in writing.  Two months later, Ramos was charged with estafa allegedly committed from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987 to which Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”

The private prosecutors raised that the statements of Felipe Ramos taken on the investigation of 09 February 1986, together with his handwritten note, were confessions to the crime that the latter was being accused of.  The trial court judge dismissed the use of the said evidences since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos was denied of his rights “not to be compelled to be a witness against himself” and “to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.”

HELD:

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.  It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

It should be noted that the following are the rights of a suspect in a crime:

·          BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

·          AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

•     to refuse to be a witness;
•     not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
•     to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
•     WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It is clear from the facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation (that which is initiated by government officers under custody).  The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in the Constitution.  His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.  They should hereby be annulled and set aside. 

Case Notes:

·          The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. 

·          The objective of the Miranda Rights is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."