Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

G.R. No. 121777 24 January 2001

FACTS:

Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

ISSUES:

1. Is Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement void for vagueness?
2. Whether herein appellant committed the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:

1. NO. Section 13(b) is not overbroad. It encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral.
2. NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only two persons, Amanita and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by the appellant.

Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DOMINGO PANIS and SERAPIO ABUG

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 11 July 1990

FACTS:

Four informations were filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City alleging that Serapio Abug, “without securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as holder of authority did then and there operate a fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses and promising employment in Saudi Arabia”

ISSUE: 

Whether all the acts mentioned in Article 13(b) of PD 442 are indispensable requirements in order to constitute illegal recruitment and placement.

RULING:

NO. Article 13(b) states that “Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement”.

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient in the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(B) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.

Case Digest: STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC., and CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT vs. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.

G.R. No. 177498 18 January 2012

FACTS:

Medequillo filed a complaint before the POEA against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and failure to deploy. On 06 November 1991, he was hired by Stolt Nielsen on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Management on board the vessel Stolt Aspiration. While the vessel was docked at MV Stolt Aspiration, he joined the crew for nearly three months. However, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and he was repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation.

He was transferred to Stolt Pride under a second contract, with approval of the POEA. Despite the commencement of the second contract, he was not deployed despite follow-ups from Medequillo. When he sought for the return of his passport, seaman’s book and other papers, he was made to sign a document that he cannot seek for employment with other agencies.

LABOR ARBITER: The Labor Arbiter found that Medequillo was constructively dismissed. He found that the first contract entered into by and between the petitioner and Medequillo had been novated by the second contract. Petitioners appealed that Medequillo cannot be considered as having been illegally dismissed because he had not even been deployed yet.

NLRC: The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified terminal

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not the first employment contract between the petitioner and Medequillo is separate and distinct from the second one.
2. What is the consequence of the non-deployment of the respondent?

RULING:

1. YES. With the finding that respondent was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with the petitioners on the second contract, novation became an unavoidable conclusion.
2. The POEA Standard Employment Conract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire. Thus, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of the respondent while on board the first ship cannot be sustained to justify non-deployment. Under the POEA Rules, failure of an agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for the suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELISSA CHUA

G.R. No. 184058

Ponente: Carpio Morales, J.

DOCTRINE: An employee, even a temporary one, may be held liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the employer.

FACTS:

Melissa Chua and one Josie Campos were charged with Large Scale Illegal Recruitment and Estafa for allegedly recruiting Erik Tan, Marilyn Macaranas, Napoleon Yu, Harry King and Roberto Angeles as factory workers in Taiwan. Chua, claimed to be merely working as a temporary cashier for Golden Gate, Inc., were paid by the private complainants placement fees in exchange for their promised employments abroad. Said placement fees ranged from Php25,000.00 to Php80,000.00 for which she issued receipts thereto.  After the failure to deploy the complainants and refund their placement fees, they found out that Golden Gate Inc.’s license had already expired.

Chua claims that she did not receive any money for she turned over the placement fees she received to the documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, and was ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng.

ISSUE: Whether or not Melissa Chua is guilty of illegal recruitment in a large scale despite being merely a temporary employee of Golden Gate, Inc.

RULING:

Yes. Article 38(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, under which Chua was charged defines illegal recruitment as “any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.” Any recruitment activities to be undertaken by a non-licensee, or in this case, an agency with an expired license, shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code. 

Chua was positively identified as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure from them employment abroad. Even if Chua was a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with her employer, as it is shown that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.

Case Digest: Oks Designtech, Inc. vs. Caccam

OKS DESIGNTECH, INC. represented by ZAMBY O. PONGAD vs. MARY JAYNE L. CACCAM

G.R. No. 211263 05 August 2015

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner hired Respondent as an accountant under a Contract of Employment for a Fixed Period for 6 months. Her contract was thereafter renewed for another 6 months. About nineteen days before the expiration of her second contract, Respondent received a letter from Company Manager Pongad informing her of the impending expiration of her contract.  As Respondent felt that she was summarily dismissed by the aforestated letter, she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Respondent claimed that she was a regular employee and argued that the nature of her work was necessary and desirable to the business of the Petitioner. On the other hand, herein Petitioner claims that the present labor case was only filed in retaliation of the criminal case of Qualified Theft and Falsification of Private Documents after having discovered several unauthorized withdrawals amounting to Php500,000.00 from its bank in violation of the trust and confidence reposed in her. Further, the Petitioner interposed that the letter received by the Respondent was a mere notice of the expiration of her contract, and not a termination notice.

Labor Arbiter: The LA found that the Respondent was illegally dismissed after having found that her employment contract was only signed on April 21, 2008, and not on January 21, 2008, the date when she actually started working for the Petitioner.  Although initially deemed as a probationary contract, by extending the same for another year, she attained the status of a regular employee.

NLRC: The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s decision and found that there was no factual basis to support the conclusion that the first contract was for a probationary employment.

CA: The Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the LA. The CA ruled that the terms and conditions of the first contract and the second contract negated a fixed-term employment since they state that respondent’s employment may be terminated prior to the expiration thereof for “just or authorized cause or when the EMPLOYEE fails to meet the reasonable standards made known to him by the EMPLOYER.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Respondent was a fixed-period employee.

RULING:

YES. The Supreme Court held that  even if an employee is engaged to perform activities that are necessary or desirable in the usual trade or business of the employer, the same does not preclude the fixing of employment for a definite period. Article 280 [now, Article 294] of the Labor Code does not proscribe or prohibit an employment contract with a fixed period provided the same is entered into by the parties, without any force, duress or improper pressure being brought to bear upon the employee and absent any other circumstance vitiating consent. 

In fact, the Court, in Brent, had already pronounced that the decisive determinant in fixed-term employment should not be the activities that the employee is called upon to perform, but the day certain agreed upon by the parties for the commencement and termination of their employment relationship.

Case Title: Naguit vs. San Miguel Corporation

CESAR NAGUIT vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 188839 22 June 2015

Peralta, J.

Facts:

Petitioner was an employee of San Miguel Corporation Metal Closure and Lithography Plant, a division of Respondent Corporation (SMC). Sometime in 23 September 2002, Renato Regala and Petitioner got involved in an altercation in Respondent Corporation’s Canlubang Plant. Petitioner claims that the altercation sprung from an event when Regala distributed libellous materials against the union which Petitioner is a union steward. Upon investigation of the Respondent Company’s Human Resource Department, petitioner chose to remain silent and did not address the charges against him. He was later terminated.

LA: The Labor Arbiter dismissed Petitioner’s complaint for illegal dismissal for lack of merit.

NLRC: The NLRC dismissed the Petitioner’s appeal and affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not Petitioner had been illegally dismissed and is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages.

RULING:

NO. As noted by the Labor Arbiter, other than his bare allegations, petitioner did not submit proof to support his allegations nor did he provide evidence to counter those which were submitted by respondent. The Supreme Court did not agree with petitioner's argument that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him is too harsh and is not commensurate to the infraction he has committed, considering that he has been in respondent's employ for fifteen years and that this is just his first offense of this nature. The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment. Where the totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant the dismissal of the employees, the law warrants their dismissal without making any distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent.

Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS

G.R. No. 141471.              September 18, 2000

Facts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA.  Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner.  This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed.  Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. 

After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike.  After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination.  The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining.  As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith.  Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA.  Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.  Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table.  While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.  Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment.  When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

Case Digest: Mylene Carvajal vs. Luzon Development Bank and/or Oscar Ramirez

G.R. No. 186169                01 August 2012

FACTS:

Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon Development Bank (Bank) under a six-month probationary employment contract.  Ramirez is the President and CEO of the Bank.  A month into her employment, she was send a Memorandum directing her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for her eight tardiness on November 2003.  A second Memorandum was sent to her on January for her again chronic tardiness on December 2003.  She submitted her written explanations for both events and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions.  She was terminated for three days effective 21 January 2004.  However, on 22 January, her termination was lifted but at the same time, her services were terminated.  In the respondents’ position paper to the LA, they explained that the reasons for her absence are chronic tardiness, absenteeism and failure to perform satisfactorily as a probationary employee.

LA Decision: The petitioner was illegally dismissed because she was not afforded the notice in writing informing her of what the Bank would like to bring out to her for the latter to answer in writing.

NLRC Decision: NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

CA Decision: The CA found that the petitioner was not entitled to backwages because she was rightfully dismissed for failure to meet the employment standards.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner can be considered a regular employee at the time of her dismissal.

HELD:

No. Carvajal’s appointment letter reads that “Possible extension of this contract will depend on the job requirements of the Bank and your overall performance.  Performance review will be conducted before possible renewal can take effect.”  Therefore, petitioner knew, at the time of her engagement, that she must comply with the standards set forth by respondent and perform satisfactorily in order to attain regular status.  Even the NLRC upheld the petitoner’s probationary status, stating that reinstatement is not synonymous to regularization.

Although probationary employees also enjoy security of tenure, he may still be terminated because of just and authorized causes of termination and the additional ground under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e. the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance to the reasonable standards set by the employer.  Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector.  This, together with absenteeism, underperformance and mistake in clearing a check are infractions that cannot be tantamount to satisfactory standards.

In addition to the abovementioned, it has been previously held in PDI vs. Magtibay, Jr., that the second requirement under Article 281 does not require notice and hearing.  Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known to him at the time of his engagement.  By the very nature of probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and continuous scrutiny by his supervisors.  If termination is for cause, it may be done at anytime during the probation. 

Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99         19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.  After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary.  Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal.  The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case. 

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day  The Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied.  Despite said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.  Due to the loss of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals.  Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives.  The letters specifically cited the Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts.  The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.  On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.  The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.       Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2.       Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.

HELD:

1.    Yes.  The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.  Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.  Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila.  It is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.  A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code.  These requisites were not complied with by the Union.  Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members are bound to.  To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend DOLE hearings.  The Union members should know from common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses.  In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.

Case Digest: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913                08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as guidance counselor.  In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.

They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and premature.  They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required under the law.  In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed evident bad faith. 

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.  Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.  It further held that the Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.  The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents.  However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September 2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA.  It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law.  In so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.  Petitioner’s intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to the deadline set by law.  The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause to the school’d operation is only trivial. 
2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March 2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos.  The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not timely comply with the requirements set by law.