Case Digest: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

G.R. No. 133495                03 September 1998

Doctrine:  It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to apply.

FACTS:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja.  On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995.  On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years.  On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections.  However, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:  Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:

No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.  The purposes of said limitation are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of enhancing the freedom of the choice of people.  Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.  To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.

Case Digest: Dante O. Casibang vs. Honorable Narciso A. Aquino

20 August 1979

FACTS:

Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan.  Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect.  Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and
2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure.

RULING:

1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”
2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." 

Confusing Concepts: Initiative vs. Referendum

The difference between an initiative and referendum is oftentimes a subject of confusion.  This difference has been further discussed in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC.  The below overview has been provided for the purposes of simple elaboration.


In the enactment of Sec. 3, Republic Act 6735,  "Initiative and Referendum Act," the difference between one term from the other is discussed.

(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose.

x x x

(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for the purpose.

(Emphasis has been supplied.)

It has also been noted by Justice Isagani Cruz that in most cases when a referendum would become a law if there is no action on the provided by the electors.


The table below also provides a head-to-head difference of the two concepts.

	Initiative	Referendum
Initial Source	The people	The Congress
Congress intervention?	No	Yes
Nature	Proposal by the people	Approval or rejection by the people
Scope	Amendments only	Amendments and revision