Case Digest: Restituto Ynot vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et. al.

G.R. No. 74457      20 March 1987

Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo in January 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander for violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of E.O. No. 626 (except when the carabo is seven years old if male, and eleven years old if female).  The penalty is confiscation of the carabaos and/or the carabeef.

ISSUE:

Whether E.O. No. 626-A is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes the outright confiscation of carabao and carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries, thus denying due process.

RULING:

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain so conveniently resilient for due process is not an “iron rule.”  Flexibility must be the best virtue of guaranty.  The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness.

It is noted that E.O. No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement.  The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the question of measure is missing.  Even if there was a reasonable relation, the penalty being an outright confiscation and a supersedeas bond of Php12,000.00.  The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, thus denying the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

To sum up, it was found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive.  Due process is violated for the owner was denied the right to hear his defense and was not seen fit to assert and protect his rights.  Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional, and the superseceas bond is cancelled.

Case Digest: Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al.

G.R. No. 180643                25 March 2008

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China.  Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate.  Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
2. Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

RULING:

1. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege.  Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege.  The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”  Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.  The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation.  These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential.  The information subject to this case belongs to such kind. 
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure.  Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.”  Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.

Case Digest: Brillantes, Jr. vs. Yorac

G.R. No. 93867                  18 December 1990           Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chariman Davide.  The petitioner argues that the choice of the Acting Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC.  It is also averred that the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”  Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.  Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.  The choice of temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.  That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President.   The designation by the President of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is declared unconstitutional.

Case Digest: Montejo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118702                16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

	Census 1990	Census 1994
First District	303, 349	178, 688
Second District	272, 167	156, 462
Third District	214, 499	125, 763
Fourth District	269, 347	155, 995
Fifth District	309, 148	181, 242

ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one.  Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.  Section 1 is then annulled and set aside.  The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.