Case Digest: National Development Company vs. Court of Appeals

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION

G.R. No. L-49407 19 August 1988

Facts:

National Development Company (NDC) appointed Maritime Company of the Philippines (MCP) as its agent to manage and operate its vessel, ‘Dona Nati’, for and in behalf of its account. In 1964, while en route to Japan from San Francisco, Dona Nati collided with a Japanese vessel, ‘SS Yasushima Maru’, causing its cargo to be damaged and lost. The private respondent, as insurer to the consigners, paid almost Php400,000.00 for said lost and damaged cargo. Hence, the private respondent instituted an action to recover from NDC.

Issue: 

Which laws govern the loss and destruction of goods due to collision of vessels outside Philippine waters?

Ruling:

In a previously decided case, it was held that the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported governs the liability of the common carrier in case of their loss, destruction or deterioration pursuant to Article 1753 of the Civil Code.  It is immaterial that the collision actually occurred in foreign waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.

It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil Code, hence, we apply Articles 826 to 839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively with collision of vessels.

Case Digest: Gaudencio Demaisip v. The Court of Appeals

25 September 1959 :: G.R. No. L-13000

FACTS:

The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927.  Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva – an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him.  Nevertheless, the Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do so. 

Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application for the same lots.  He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of P350.  When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.

The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at P1,600.  However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision.  Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary.

HELD:

It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President.  The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless disapproved by the latter.  It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s action should not be entertained.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one – wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

Case Digest: Gaudencio Demaisip v. The Court of Appeals

25 September 1959 :: G.R. No. L-13000

FACTS:

The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927.  Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva – an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him.  Nevertheless, the Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do so. 

Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application for the same lots.  He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of P350.  When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.

The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at P1,600.  However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision.  Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary.

HELD:

It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President.  The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless disapproved by the latter.  It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s action should not be entertained.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one – wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

Case Digest: Montejo v. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 118702                16 March 1995

Ponente: Puno, J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said to violate the principle of equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.

For an overview of the distribution in the province, see the below table for the population distribution, census 1990 and 1994:

	Census 1990	Census 1994
First District	303, 349	178, 688
Second District	272, 167	156, 462
Third District	214, 499	125, 763
Fourth District	269, 347	155, 995
Fifth District	309, 148	181, 242

ISSUES:

Whether COMELEC has the jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

HELD/RULING:

The basic powers of COMELEC are spelled out in Section 2(c), Article IX of the Constitution, which states:

Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections is hereby empowered to make minor adjustments of the reapportionment herein made.

The meaning of minor adjustments is found in the debates of the Commission wherein it was stated that the transfer of one municipality in a district to another district is not a minor adjustment; rather it is a substantive one.  Minor adjustments does not allow the change in allocations per district.

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No. 2736.  Section 1 is then annulled and set aside.  The petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte is denied.