Case Digest: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

G.R. No. 133495                03 September 1998

Doctrine:  It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to apply.

FACTS:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja.  On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995.  On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years.  On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections.  However, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:  Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:

No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.  The purposes of said limitation are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of enhancing the freedom of the choice of people.  Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.  To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.

Reviewer: Constitutional Law II

It's finals period again!


Sharing this simple Consti 2 reviewer. 


Download it HERE.

Case Digest: Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211

15 September 1989

En Banc

FACTS:

After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile.  Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.  But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: 

Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned.

RULING:

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of the “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.  Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.  It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common good.  The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

Case Digest: Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and Guillermo Carague

No. L-79974        December 17, 1987

En Banc

FACTS:

When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:  Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16, Article VII.

RULING:

Mison’s appointment is constitutional.  Sec. 16, Article VII states that:

“Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x”

It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA.  Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA.  In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. 

Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that “Sec. 601. – x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.”

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396                03 May 2006                              Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same.  She did so citing the following bases:

• The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
• Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.  It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

• February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
• February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20^th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
• February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.  Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.  The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.  However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
• The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

• Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20^th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
• Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
• Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1. The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.  During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  An otherwise moot case may still be decided “provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance” (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so.  As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily.  It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.  Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, the “acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.  The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.  A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in one’s presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge – both of which are not present in David’s warrantless arrest.  This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”  Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing.   In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Case Digest: Sanders and Moreau, Jr. vs. Veridiano II

10 June 1988                      G.R. No. L-56930

FACTS:

Rossi and Wyer were advised that their employment had been converted from permanent full-time to permanent part-time.  Their reaction was to protest this conversion and to institute grievance proceedings conformably to the pertinent rules and regulations of the US DoD.  Moreau sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change of employment status of the two from which Rossi and Wyer filed in the Court of First Instance of Olongapo City a complaint for damages against the herein petitioners claiming that the letters contained libellous imputations against the two.  Due to the failure to appear in the court, Moreau and Sanders were declared in default.

ISSUE: 

Whether the petitioners were performing their official duties when they did the acts for which they have been sued for damages.

RULING:

It is abundantly clear in the present case that the acts for which the petitioners are being called to account were performed by them in the discharge of their official duties.  Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had supervision over its personnel and had a hand in their employment, work assignments, discipline, dismissal and other related matters.  The same can be said for Moreau.  Given the official character of the above-described letters, it can be concluded that the petitioners were being sued as officers of the United States government.  There should be no question by now that such complaint cannot prosper unless the government sought to be held ultimately liable has given its consent to be sued.

Case Digest: Joseph Estrada vs. Aniano Disierto

G.R. No. 146710-15      02 March 2001

FACTS:

After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and members of the President’s administration started resigning one by one.  In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate.  The impeachment trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most evident in the EDSA Dos rally.  On January 20, the President submitted two letters – one signifying his leave from the Palace and the other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution.  Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioner resigned as President; and
2. Whether the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning

RULING:

1. For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country.  This is of high grade evidence of his intent to resign.
2. Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court.  The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable.  But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely.  There was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.

Case Digest: Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General

FACTS:

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.  Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. 

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of the executive orders aforementioned.

ISSUE:

Whether the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that the President does not have the authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.

RULING:

Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers.  This power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned.  Such control does not include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one.  Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in him by the Constitution. 

The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

Case Digest: Osmeña, Jr. vs. Pendatun, et. al.

G.R. No. L-17144               28 October 1960               

Ponente: Bengzon, J.

FACTS:

Congressman Osmeña took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech, entitled ‘A Message to Garcia’ wherein said speech contained serious imputations of bribery against the President.  Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmeña was then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behaviour by the House of Representatives.  Osmeña argues that the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned.

ISSUE:

Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution.

RULING:

Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution.  Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other place.”  Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself.  Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” in Congress.

Case Digest: Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC

05 May 1994                       G.R. No. 113375

Ponente: Davide, JR., J.

FACTS:

The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds.  Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating on an online lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO.  Considering the citizenship requirement, the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in PGMC to 40% by selling 35% out of the original 75% foreign stockholdings to local investors.  An open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed through.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing); and
2. Whether the Contract of Lease is legal and valid in light of Sec. 1 of R.A. 1169 as amended by B.P. Blg. 42.

RULING:

1. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the public that the case demands.  The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic and moral well-being of the people.  The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.
2. Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries “in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company, or entity, whether domestic or foreign.”  The language of the section is clear that with respect to its franchise or privilege “to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities,” the PCSO cannot exercise it “in collaboration, association or joint venture” with any other party.  This is the unequivocal meaning and import of the phrase. By the exception explicitly made, the PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of the methods mentioned, nor can it transfer, assign or lease such franchise.  

Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.

G.R. No. 101949                01 December 1994

FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of Paranaque.  Said lot was contiguous with two other lots.  These lots were sold to Ramon Licup.  In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters.  Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of International Law.  Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations.  In the present case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis.  However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. 

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature.  The lot was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila.  The donation was made not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio.  The decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental character.  Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain.  It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.  

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ruben Ayson and Felipe Ramos

07 July 1989                   

G.R. No. 85215

 

Ponente: Narvasa, J.

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.  The PAL manager sent him a letter regarding his involvement on the irregularities of the sales of plane tickets, wherein an investigation is to be made on 09 February 1986.  The day before the said investigation, Ramos sent a handwritten note to his superiors stating that he is willing to settle the said irregularities of approximately Php76,000.00.

In the said investigation done by the PAL Baguio Branch Manager, Edgardo Cruz in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Ramos agreed that his answers be taken down in writing.  Two months later, Ramos was charged with estafa allegedly committed from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987 to which Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”

The private prosecutors raised that the statements of Felipe Ramos taken on the investigation of 09 February 1986, together with his handwritten note, were confessions to the crime that the latter was being accused of.  The trial court judge dismissed the use of the said evidences since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos was denied of his rights “not to be compelled to be a witness against himself” and “to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.”

HELD:

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.  It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

It should be noted that the following are the rights of a suspect in a crime:

·          BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

·          AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

•     to refuse to be a witness;
•     not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
•     to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
•     WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It is clear from the facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation (that which is initiated by government officers under custody).  The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in the Constitution.  His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.  They should hereby be annulled and set aside. 

Case Notes:

·          The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. 

·          The objective of the Miranda Rights is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights." 

Case Digest: Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.

G.R. No. 101083                                                July 30, 1993

En Banc

PONENTE:  Davide, Jr., J

FACTS:

The petitioners, all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.  This case is filed not only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

Together with the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), the petitioners presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.  One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as the “greenhouse effect”. 

Continued issuance by the defendant of TLAs to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to the plaintiffs.  Appellants have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant’s office regarding the plea to cancel the said TLAs.  The defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel existing TLAs.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing on the said case
2. Admitting that all facts presented are true, whether or not the court can render a valid judgement in accordance to the prayer of the complaints
3.  Whether or not the TLAs may be revoked despite the respondents standing that these cancellation of these TLAs are against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution

HELD:

1. The petitioners have locus standi (legal standing) on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit.  The subject matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines.  The court found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit.
2. The right of the petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology has been clearly stated.  A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.  The granting of the TLAs, as the petitioners claim to be done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology hence, the full protection thereof requires that no TLAs should be renewed or granted. The appellants have also submitted a document with the sub-header CAUSE OF ACTION which is adequate enough to show, prima facie, the violation of their rights.  On this basis, these actions must therefore be granted, wholly or partially.
3. Despite the Constitution’s non-impairment clause, TLAs are not contracts, rather licenses; thus, the said clause cannot be invoked.  Even if these are protected by the said clause, these can be revoked if the public interest so required as stated in Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705).  Furthermore, Section 16 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that: “The State shall protect the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.”  The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the government.  The said right is also clear as the DENR’s duty – under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under Executive Order No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded.  It is not a contract, property or property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution.

Case Digest: Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, et. al.

G.R. No. 180643                25 March 2008

FACTS:

On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed by the Republic of China.  Several Resolutions regarding the investigation and implications on national security and government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN Project were introduced in Senate.  Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege. For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned, Neri was held in contempt.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
2. Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28, Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
3. Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by holding Neri in contempt.

RULING:

1. The communications elicited by the three questions are covered by executive privilege.  Despite the revocation of E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege.  The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.”  Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and certain reason that the said information may impair the country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Republic of China.
2. The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.  The right to public information and full public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject to limitation.  These include those that are classified by the body of jurisprudence as highly confidential.  The information subject to this case belongs to such kind. 
3. The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure.  Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure.”  Without these, the aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.