Case Digest: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN vs. ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTIES OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS

G.R. No. 141471.              September 18, 2000

Facts:

During the renegotiation of the respondent unions Collective Bargaining Agreement with the petitioner, Eleonor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President of the union. Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. However, the union members rejected the said CBA.  Thereafter, petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of the petitioner.  This decision was reversed on appeal with the NLRC.

The parties later agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on new five-year CBA. During the pendency of approval of proposals, Ambas was informed that her work schedule was being changed.  Ambas protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA. 

After the petitioner’s inaction on the CBA, the union filed a notice to strike.  After meeting with the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for renegotiation, Ambas received a letter dismissing her for alleged insubordination.  The petitioner then ceased negotiations when it received news that another labor organization had filed a petition for certification.

The union finally struck, but the Secretary of Labor and Employment ordered them to return to work and for petitioner to accept them back.  The Secretary of Labor and Employment later rendered judgement that the petitioner had been guilty of unfair labor practice. The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the former.

Issue(s):

1. Whether petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the ongoing negotiations for a new CBA; and
2. Whether the termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees’ right to self-organization.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the petition unmeritorious.

1. The petitioner’s failure to act upon the submitted CBA proposal within the ten-day period exemplified in Article 250 of the Labor Code is a clear violation of the governing procedure of collective bargaining.  As the Court has held in Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, the company’s refusal to make counter-proposal to the union’s proposed CBA is an indication of bad faith.  Moreover, the succeeding events are obvious signs that the petitioner had merely been employing delaying tactics to the passage of the proposed CBA.  Moreover, in order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process, there must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue.  Hence, the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
2. The factual backdrop of the termination of Ambas led the Court to no other conclusion that she was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers in the bargaining table.  While the Court recognizes the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of aw and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play.  Even assuming arguendo that Ambas was guilty of insubordination, such disobedience was not a valid ground to terminate her employment.  When the exercise of the management to discipline its employees tends to interfere with the employees’ right to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act.

Case Digest: Mylene Carvajal vs. Luzon Development Bank and/or Oscar Ramirez

G.R. No. 186169                01 August 2012

FACTS:

Carvajal was employed as a trainee-teller by Luzon Development Bank (Bank) under a six-month probationary employment contract.  Ramirez is the President and CEO of the Bank.  A month into her employment, she was send a Memorandum directing her to explain in writing why she should not be subjected to disciplinary action for her eight tardiness on November 2003.  A second Memorandum was sent to her on January for her again chronic tardiness on December 2003.  She submitted her written explanations for both events and manifested her acceptance of the consequences of her actions.  She was terminated for three days effective 21 January 2004.  However, on 22 January, her termination was lifted but at the same time, her services were terminated.  In the respondents’ position paper to the LA, they explained that the reasons for her absence are chronic tardiness, absenteeism and failure to perform satisfactorily as a probationary employee.

LA Decision: The petitioner was illegally dismissed because she was not afforded the notice in writing informing her of what the Bank would like to bring out to her for the latter to answer in writing.

NLRC Decision: NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.

CA Decision: The CA found that the petitioner was not entitled to backwages because she was rightfully dismissed for failure to meet the employment standards.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner can be considered a regular employee at the time of her dismissal.

HELD:

No. Carvajal’s appointment letter reads that “Possible extension of this contract will depend on the job requirements of the Bank and your overall performance.  Performance review will be conducted before possible renewal can take effect.”  Therefore, petitioner knew, at the time of her engagement, that she must comply with the standards set forth by respondent and perform satisfactorily in order to attain regular status.  Even the NLRC upheld the petitoner’s probationary status, stating that reinstatement is not synonymous to regularization.

Although probationary employees also enjoy security of tenure, he may still be terminated because of just and authorized causes of termination and the additional ground under Article 281 of the Labor Code, i.e. the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance to the reasonable standards set by the employer.  Punctuality is a reasonable standard imposed on every employee, whether in government or private sector.  This, together with absenteeism, underperformance and mistake in clearing a check are infractions that cannot be tantamount to satisfactory standards.

In addition to the abovementioned, it has been previously held in PDI vs. Magtibay, Jr., that the second requirement under Article 281 does not require notice and hearing.  Due process of law for this second ground consists of making the reasonable standards expected of the employee during his probationary period known to him at the time of his engagement.  By the very nature of probationary employment, the employee knows from the very start that he will be under close observation and continuous scrutiny by his supervisors.  If termination is for cause, it may be done at anytime during the probation. 

Case Digest: Sehwani, Incorporated and/or Benita’s Fries, Inc. vs. In-n-out Burger, Inc.

Petitioner’s Claims:

Petitioners alleged that the Respondent lack the legal capacity to sue because it was not doing business in the Philippines and that it has no cause of action because its mark is not registered or used in the Philippines.  Sehwani, Inc. also claimed that as the registered owner of the “IN N OUT” mark, it enjoys the presumption that the same was validly acquired and that it has the exclusive right to use the mark.  Moreover, petitioners argued that other than the bare allegation of fraud in the registration of the mark, respondent failed to show the existence of any grounds of cancellation thereof under Section 151 of the IP Code of the Philippines.  It also alleged that the action is barred by laches.

Respondent’s Claims:

Respondent, In-n-out Burger, Inc.,  alleged that it is the owner of the tradename “IN-N-OUT” and trademarks “IN-N-OUT,” “IN-N-OUT Burger & Arrow Design” and “IN-N-OUT Burger Logo” which are used in its business since 1948 up to the present.  These tradename and trademarks were registered in the United States as well as in other parts of the world.  Petitioner Sehwani allegedly had obtained a trademark registration for the mark “IN N OUT” (with the inside letter O formed like a star) without its authority.

Issue/s:

• Whether or not the Respondent has the legal capacity to sue for the protection of its trademarks albeit it is not doing business in the Philippines
• Whether or not a ground exists for the cancellation of the Petitioners’ registration

Ruling:

•  Yes. Section 160 RA No. 8293 provides for the right of foreign corporations to sue in trademark or service mark enforcement action, provided that it meets the requirements under Section 3 thereof, which are:

a.       Any convention, treaty or agreement relation to intellectual property right or the repression of unfair competition wherein Philippines is also a party; and

b.      An extension therein of reciprocal rights.

Moreoever, Article 6bis of The Paris Convention, which governs the protection of well-known trademarks, is a self-executing provision and does not require legislative enactment to give it effect in the member country.  The essential requirement therein is that the trademark must be well-known in the country where protection is sought.  In this case, Director Beltran-Abelardo found that In-n-out Burger and Arrow Design is an internationally well0known mark as evidenced by its trademark registrations around the world and its comprehensive advertisements therein.

• Yes. Section 151(b) of RA 8293 provides that a petition to cancel a registration of a mark may be filed with the Bureau of Legal Affairs by any person who believes that he is or will be damaged by the registration of a mark at any time, if the registered mark becomes the generic name for the goods or services, or a portion thereof, for which it is registered, or has been abandoned, or its registration was fraudulently or contrary to the provisions of this Act, or if the registered mark is being used by or with the permission of, the registrant so as to misrepresent the source of goods or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.  The evidence showed that not only did the petitioners use the IN-N-OUT Burger trademark for the name of their restaurant, but they also used identical or confusingly similar mark for their hamburger wrappers and French-fries receptacles, thereby effectively misrepresenting the source of the goods and services.

Case Digest: Lung Center of the Philippines vs. Quezon City and Constantino Rosas

G.R. No. 144104             June 29, 2004

FACTS:

The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon City.  Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the Philippines.  The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private parties.  The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center.  The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies from the government.

Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5 million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the Claim.  When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was dismissed.  The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are used exclusively for charity.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its property for commercial purposes.

HELD:

The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter and articles of incorporation.  As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.

Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.  (strictissimi juris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823 only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:

•         income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
•          taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases (expression unius est exclusion alterius/expressium facit cessare tacitum).

Case Digest: Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas and La Flor de la Isabela, Inc. vs. Hon. Virgilio A. Sevandal, et al.

Petitioners’ Claims:

Petitioners claimed in its Letter-Complaint to the SEC that Tabaqueria, owned by its former General Manager, Gabriel Ripoll, cannot be allowed to continue said name because it will confuse and deceive the public into believing that Tabaqueria is operated and managed by, and part of Tabacalera. Compania General, being a Spain-based company, operated under La Flor de la Isabela in the Philippines. Petitioners filed with the DOJ and the DTI a Complaint for Infringement and Unfair Competition.  Petitioners alleged that Tabaqueria deliberately sought to adopt the Tabacalera trademarks to confuse the public that the Tabaqueria cigars are the same or are somehow connected with the Tabacalera products.  As such, the Petitioners filed for a Motion to grant Cease and Desist Order in order to enjoin Tabaqueria from further producing cigars.

Respondents’ Claims:

Ripoll, now the Directing Manager of Tabaqueria, alleged that there is insufficient evidence to issue a Cease and Desist Order against him on the ground of unfair competition and infringement of trademark.  Moreover, they moved to dismiss the case on the ground of forum shopping.  Further, the Office of Legal Affairs of the DTI ruled that there was no similarity in the general appearance of the products of the parties and consumers would not be misled.  DTI further found that the competing products, in their totality, are easily distinguishable through their brand and logos. “TABACALERA” is the brand of the Tabacalera products, while “FLOR DE MANILA” is the brand of the Petitioners.  In fact, per Certification of BIR in 1994, “Flor de Manila” is the brand registered by the latter with said bureau.  As per inspection, none of their boxes even show the word “TABAQUERIA”.

Issue:

Whether or not there is substantial similarity between the two parties as to amount to unfair competition and trademark infringement, and are therefore entitled to a writ of preliminary injunction.

Ruling:

No.  The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals and the DTI.  Injunctive relief may only be issued when the right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; when the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial; and there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.  The Court found that there is no urgent and paramount necessity for the writ.  The Petitioners has not shown, at least tentatively, that there exists a fraudulent and malicious entry into the market and as a result thereby, their sales dropped by 25%.

Case Digest: Caltex (Philippines), Inc. vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals and City Assessor of Pasay

G.R. No. L-50466               May 31, 1982

FACTS:

Various machines and equipments are loaned by Caltex to gas station operators under an appropriate lease agreement or receipt.  These are underground tanks, gasoline pumps, water pumps, car washer and air compressors, among others. It is stipulated in the lease contract that the operators, upon demand, shall return to Caltex the machines and equipment in good condition as when received. The lessor of the land, where the gas station is located, does not become the owner of the machines and equipment installed therein. Caltex retains the ownership thereof during the term of the lease.  The city assessor of Pasay City characterized the said items of gas station equipment and machinery as taxable realty.  However, the city board of tax appeals ruled that they are personalty.

The City Board of Tax Appeals decided that the definitions of realty and personalty under the Civil Code do not apply in this case.  Instead, the definition under the Real Property Tax Code should be followed.  Thus, the property in controversy are real in nature and subject to realty tax.

ISSUE:

Whether the pieces of gas station equipment and machinery already enumerated are subject to realty tax.

HELD:

The Court held that the said equipment and machinery, as appurtenances to the gas station building or shed owned by Caltex (as to which it is subject to realty tax) and which fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station, for without them the gas station would be useless, and which have been attached or affixed permanently to the gas station site or embedded therein, are taxable improvements and machinery within the meaning of the Assessment Law and the Real Property Tax Code.  Under the Real Property Tax Code, “improvements” are defined as “valuable addition made to property or an amelioration in its condition, amounting to more than mere repairs or replacement of waste, costing labor or capital and intended to enhance its value, beauty or utility or to adapt it for new or further purposes.”  On the other hand, “machinery” is embraces “machines, mechanical contrivances, instruments, appliances and apparatus attached to the real estate.”  Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty even though for some purposes they might be considered personalty.

Case Digest: Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 163217                18 April 2006

FACTS:

On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from Santos’ house.  At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot.  Artemio had been shot on the chest.  He shouted at Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.)  Lito saw a man running away from the direction of Artemio’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face.  Artemio’s wife, Ernita, came running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the ground and bloodied.  She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise.  Ernita shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)

Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople.  He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP.  To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s store.  Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him because of the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s family, but he could not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence. 

During the trial of the case, Ernita positively identified Marturillas as her husband’s assailant.  This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ testimony and expert witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle.  However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.

RULING:

Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one “running away” immediately after the sound of a gunshot.  Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running.  She also clarified that she had heard the statement, “help me pre, I was shot by the captain.”  The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the CA that Ernita’s testimony is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house.  The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features.  Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.  Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics.  Settled is the rule that on questions of credibility of witnesses and veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by Ernita.  He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.

Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.  Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.  These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.  All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case: 

1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 

2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 

3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.  

Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.

Case Digest: Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines

 G.R. No. 176389                14 December 2010

FACTS:

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City.  Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime.  It presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime.  She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits.  She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.  Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.  Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution to its success.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.

In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence.  After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela.  Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the United States.  He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992.  As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA.  Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.

RULING:

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:

1. The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
2. The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.  She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.  She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.  And although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.  She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that:

1. He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb.  This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused.  For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold altogether.  Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.

Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99         19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.  After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary.  Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal.  The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case. 

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day  The Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied.  Despite said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.  Due to the loss of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals.  Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives.  The letters specifically cited the Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts.  The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.  On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.  The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.       Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2.       Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.

HELD:

1.    Yes.  The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.  Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.  Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila.  It is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.  A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code.  These requisites were not complied with by the Union.  Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members are bound to.  To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend DOLE hearings.  The Union members should know from common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses.  In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.

Case Digest: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913                08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as guidance counselor.  In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.

They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and premature.  They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required under the law.  In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed evident bad faith. 

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.  Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.  It further held that the Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.  The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents.  However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September 2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA.  It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law.  In so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.  Petitioner’s intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to the deadline set by law.  The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause to the school’d operation is only trivial. 
2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March 2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos.  The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not timely comply with the requirements set by law.

Case Digest: Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco, et al.

Petitioner’s Claims:

Mattel, Inc. alleges that Uy’s “Barbie” trademark of confectionary products was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories.  Mattel argues that its products are items related to Uy’s products; hence, identical trademarks should not be used where the possibility of confusion as to source or origin of the products is certain and that by adopting an exactly identical mark, in spelling and style, Uy should be presumed to have intended to cash in or ride on the goodwill and widespread recognition enjoyed by Mattel’s mark.

Respondents’ Claims:

Jimmy Uy contends that there is no similarity between the two goods.  Emma Francisco, the Director General of IPO, stated that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under the trademark “Barbie” to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical “Barbie” trademark on said goods.  On the other hand, Uy submits that the case has become moot and academic since the records of the IPO will show that no DAU was filed on or before 01 December 2001; thus he is deemed to have abandoned his trademark application.

Issue:

Whether or not the case has become moot and academic

Ruling:

Yes. According to Section 124.2 of RA 8293, the applicant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect with three years from filing date of the application.  Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused.  Moreover, the issues in the present case call for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.  The issues raised in this case do not call for a clarification unlike in the cases of David vs. Arroyo, Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan and others.  In the latter cases, moot and academic issues were still decided for these pertain to important and transcendental constitutional issues, which are not in line with this case.