Showing posts with label criminal law. Show all posts
Showing posts with label criminal law. Show all posts

Sunday, March 16, 2014

Case Digest: Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 163217                18 April 2006

FACTS:

On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from Santos’ house.  At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot.  Artemio had been shot on the chest.  He shouted at Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.)  Lito saw a man running away from the direction of Artemio’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face.  Artemio’s wife, Ernita, came running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the ground and bloodied.  She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise.  Ernita shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)

Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople.  He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP.  To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s store.  Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him because of the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s family, but he could not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence. 

During the trial of the case, Ernita positively identified Marturillas as her husband’s assailant.  This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ testimony and expert witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle.  However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.

RULING:

Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one “running away” immediately after the sound of a gunshot.  Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running.  She also clarified that she had heard the statement, “help me pre, I was shot by the captain.”  The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the CA that Ernita’s testimony is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house.  The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features.  Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.  Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics.  Settled is the rule that on questions of credibility of witnesses and veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by Ernita.  He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.


Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.  Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.  These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.  All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case: 

1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 
2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 
3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.  

Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.

Tuesday, September 20, 2011

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido Mara y Bolaqueña alias “Loloy”


G.R. No. 184050                08 May 2009                       
Ponente: Velasco, JR, J.

FACTS:
In the evening of the 27 February 1999, Marcelino Balos held a party at his house in Bukidnon.  As per the host, while seated at the table, the appellant suddenly hacked the victim, Gaudencio Perater, on the right side of his neck with a bolo.  According to Marcelino’s nephew, there were no words exchanged between the victim and the accused prior to the attack.

The appellant’s version states that Gaudencio was drinking with Marcelino and his nephew when the accused asked where his brother is.  Gaudencio insulted the appellant’s brother and where a fight ensued.  Upon being warned that Gaudencio was about to stab him, the appellant hit the victim’s neck in self-defense.

ISSUES:
  1. Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated; and
  2. Whether the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense should be appreciated.

RULING:
  1.   Considering the sudden manner of the attack which was done in a party, leaving the victim’s guard down and defenseless, and the lack of provocation from the victim as testified by witnesses, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is to be appreciated.  The crime therefore is murder under paragraph 1 of Article 248 of the RPC.
  2. For self-defense to occur, the defense must prove that there was (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation from the person claiming self-defense.  The first of these elements is required, and as there was only the appellant’s testimony that the victim was about to stab him as opposed to the testimonies by witnesses, it was found that the latter’s testimonies were more credible than that of the accused – that there was no attack coming from the victim’s end. Unlawful aggression is absent; thus, the accused-appellant’s claim for self-defense fails.


Tuesday, July 12, 2011

Reviewer: Justifying Circumstances

Sharing another reviewer.  This time it's on Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code on Justifying
Circumstances.



You can download it HERE.

Tuesday, July 5, 2011

Hard-to-Find Case (Full Text): Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals

1950 September 25                                                                            En Banc
G.R. No. L-2516                                                                    D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.:

For having issued a rubber check, Ang Tek Lian was convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.

It appears that, knowing he had no funds therefor, Ang Tek Lian drew on Saturday, November 16, 1946, the check Exhibit A upon the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of "cash". He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act. On November 18, 1946, the next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit of Ang Tek Lian on both dates being P335 only.

The Court of Appeals believed the version of Lee Huan Hong who testified that "on November 16, 1946, appellant went to his (complainant's) office, at 1217 Herran, Paco, Manila, and asked him to exchange Exhibit A - which he (appellant) then brought with him - with cash alleging that he needed badly the sum of P4,000 represented by the check, but could not withdraw it from the bank, it being then already closed; that in view of this request and relying upon appellant's assurance that he had sufficient funds in the bank to meet Exhibit A, and because they used to borrow money from each other, even before the war, and appellant owns a hotel and restaurant known as the North Bay Hotel, said complainant delivered to him, on the same date, the sum of P4,000 in cash; that despite repeated efforts to notify him that the check had been dishonored by the bank, appellant could not be located any-where, until he was summoned in the City Fiscal's Office in view of the complaint for estafa filed in connection therewith; and that appellant has not paid as yet the amount of the check, or any part thereof."

Inasmuch as the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final, the only question of law for decision is whether under the facts found, estafa had been accomplished.

Article 315, paragraph (d), subsection 2 of the Revised Penal Code, punishes swindling committed "By post-dating a check, or issuing such check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances."

We believe that under this provision of law Ang Tek Lian was properly held liable. In this connection, it must be stated that, as explained in People vs. Fernandez (59 Phil., 615), estafa is committed by issuing either a postdated check or an ordinary check to accomplish the deceit.

It is argued, however, that as the check had been made payable to "cash" and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged. Based on the proposition that "by uniform practice of all banks in the Philippines a check so drawn is invariably dishonored," the following line of reasoning is advanced in support of the argument:

". . . When, therefore, he (the offended party) accepted the check (Exhibit A) from the appellant, he did so with full knowledge that it would be dishonored upon presentment. In that sense, the appellant could not be said to have acted fraudulently because the complainant, in so accepting the check as it was drawn, must be considered, by every rational consideration, to have done so fully aware of the risk he was running thereby." (Brief for the appellant, p. 11.)

We are not aware of the uniformity of such practice. Instances have undoubtedly occurred wherein the Bank required the indorsement of the drawer before honoring a check payable to "cash." But cases there are too, where no such requirement had been made. It depends upon the circumstances of each transaction.

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement.

"A check payable to the order of cash is a bearer instrument. Bacal vs. National City Bank of New York (1933), 146 Misc., 732; 262 N. Y. S., 839; Cleary vs. Da Beck Plate Glass Co. (1907), 54 Misc., 537; 104 N. Y. S., 831; Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. vs. Pittsburgh Pipe & Supply Co. (Tex. Civ. App., 1939), 135 S. W. (2d), 818. See also H. Cook & Son vs. Moody (1916), 17 Ga. App., 465; 87 S. E., 713."

"Where a check is made payable to the order of 'cash', the word cash 'does not purport to be the name of any person', and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not obtain any indorsement of the check, but may pay it to the person presenting it without any indorsement. . . ." (Zollmann, Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 6, p. 494.)

Of course, if the bank is not sure of the bearer's identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification and/or assurance against possible complications, - for instance, (a) forgery of drawer's signature, (b) loss of the check by the rightful owner, (c) raising of the amount payable, etc. The bank may therefore require, for its protection, that the indorsement of the drawer - or of some other person known to it - be obtained. But where the Bank is satisfied of the identity and/or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection, it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting.

"A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder. Where a check is in the ordinary form, and is payable to bearer, so that no indorsement is required, a bank, to which it is presented for payment, need not have the holder identified, and is not negligent in failing to do so. . . ." (Michie on Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 5, p. 343.)

". . . Consequently, a drawee bank to which a bearer check is presented for payment need not necessarily have the holder identified and ordinarily may not be charged with negligence in failing to do so. See Opinions 6C:2 and 6C:3. If the bank has no reasonable cause for suspecting any irregularity, it will be protected in paying a bearer check, 'no matter what facts unknown to it may have occurred prior to the presentment.' 1 Morse, Banks and Banking, sec. 393.

"Although a bank is entitled to pay the amount of a bearer check without further inquiry, it is entirely reasonable for the bank to insist that the holder give satisfactory proof of his identity . . .." (Paton's Digest, Vol. I, p. 1089.)

Anyway, it is significant, and conclusive, that the form of the check Exhibit A was totally unconnected with its dishonor. The Court of Appeals declared that it was returned unsatisfied because the drawer had insufficient funds - not because the drawer's indorsement was lacking.

Wherefore, there being no question as to the correctness of the penalty imposed on the appellant, the writ of certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Sunday, July 3, 2011

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Corpuz y Simon

G.R. No. 175836                30 January 2009

FACTS:

For several months, the victim, a minor below 18 years of age, had been raped multiple times by herein appellant who is the live-in partner of the victim’s mother.  He would do so with threats that he would kill the victim and her mother if she would not succumb to his desires.  The victim kept the incidents to herself until she noticed that her menstruation stopped, fearing pregnancy.  It was found through examinations that the victim had old hymenal lacerations.  The appellant admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that he never used force.

ISSUE:

Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship is to be appreciated in favour of the victim in order to qualify said offense from simple rape to qualified rape.
RULING:

To obtain qualified rape, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the Information and proved with certainty.  Minority had been alleged and proved.  The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victim’s mother and the accused contracted marriage.  The prosecution, however, did not present proof to support this.  What appellant claimed is that he and the victim’s mother were merely common-law spouses, which would also qualify the offense.  Since no proof on the relationship was alleged in the Information, simple rape cannot be qualified.  Therefore, it was held that appellant committed six counts of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua

Saturday, April 30, 2011

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Gayeta y Roblo alias “Freddie”

G.R. No. 171654                17 December 2008

Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS:

While spouses Benjamin and Conchita were drinking tuba in their home, two armed men barged into their house and declared a hold-up who were later identified as herein appellant and one Reano.  Benjamin was kicked and boxed until the latter bled and lost consciousness, by which Conchita surrendered P2,500.  The two armed men then left and barged into another couple’s home and demanded them for money.  The wife, accompanied by the appellant, went to their store to get money.  In the store, the appellant forced the wife to have sexual intercourse with him.  After they had returned to their home, she told her husband that she had been sexually abused.  The husband had an altercation with the two perpetrators which resulted in him being hit on the shoulder with a bullet.

The two denied that they took part in the crime claiming that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime for Gayeta was in Muntinlupa doing his rounds as a member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade, while Reano was in another town.

ISSUE:  

Whether the accused was guilty of the crimes of robbery and robbery with rape with his presentation of the Voluntary Lakas logbook.

RULING:

The inherently weak alibi presented by the accused does not hold a stronger bearing as compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses which is given full faith by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.  Furthermore, presented logbook was neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them. 

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated in both robbery and robbery with rape.  There being no evidence to show that the accused purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense, this circumstance was ruled out.  The original penalty of death is therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.

Friday, January 14, 2011

Case Digest: Amado Alvarado Garcia vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 171951                28 August 2009

FACTS:

The Fozes were having a drinking spree at their apartment when Chy asked them to quiet down to which Garcia commented that Chy was being arrogant and that one day he would lay a hand on him.  Two days later, the group decided to drink at a store owned by Chy’s sister, Esquibel.  Chy was about to come out of his house and upon being summoned, Garcia suddenly punched him.  Chy continued to parry the blows and when he found an opportunity to escape, he ran home and phoned his wife to call the police regarding the mauling.  He also complained of difficulty in breathing.  He was found later unconscious on the kitchen floor, salivating. 

Cause of death is heart attack to which Garcia appeals that the injuries he caused were not as violent in nature as to have caused the death of Chy.  Garcia pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide.  The autopsy doctor confirms that the boxing and the striking of the bottle beer on the victim could not have caused any direct physical effect to cause the heart attack if the victim’s heart is healthy.  What could have caused said heart attack is the victims emotions concerning the violence inflicted upon him. 

ISSUE:  
Whether the circumstance of having no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed should be appreciated

RULING:


The circumstance that the petitioner did not intend so grave an evil as the death of the victim does not exempt him from criminal liability.  Since he deliberately committed an act prohibited by law, said condition simply mitigates his guilt in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Revised Penal Code.  Nevertheless, said circumstance must be appreciated in favour of the petitioner.  The fact that the physical injuries he inflicted on the victim could not have naturally and logically caused the actual death of the victim, if the latter’s heart is in good condition. 

Considering this mitigating circumstance, imposable penalty should be in the minimum period, that is, reclusion temporal in its minimum period.  Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court properly imposed upon petitioner an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Saturday, October 2, 2010

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Isaias Castillo y Completo

G.R. No. 172695 29 June 2007

FACTS:

In the evening of 5 November 1993, the accused-appellant came home drunk and angry. His father-in-law (Guillermo) tried to subdue him but to no avail which caused the former to leave the house. As he was leaving, Guillermo saw him take out his sling and arrow. Consorcia, the accused’s wife, was heard crying and screaming. Thereafter, the accused-appellant was seen carrying the bloodied body of Consorcia out of the house and was later taken to the hospital but to no avail. Cause of death was the cut jugular vein caused by a fatal weapon which could have been a “pointed instrument like a nail.”

ISSUE: 

Whether the fatal injury inflicted on the victim was accidental

RULING:

The essential requisites for this exempting circumstance are (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care; (3) he causes and injury to another by mere accident (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The mere possession of sling and arrow is punishable under the law. In penalizing the act, the consideration of the deadly weapon was used for no legal purpose, but to inflict injury. Also, the fact that the accused-appellant disappeared while his wife was in the hospital is unbecoming of a husband with a dying wife. Due to the weakness of the defense’s evidence, the claim that the act was accidental cannot be appreciated in favour of the accused.
Wherefore, the accused was found guilty of the crime of Parricide wherein the court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Wednesday, September 15, 2010

Where are the Digests?

The Girl Who Kicked the Hornet's NestSome of you may be wondering where I have placed all of those case digests that can be seen from http://reenfab.wordpress.com.  They're still here.  It's just that I've been recently using these for a project of my own due on October.  So don't you worry.  Once the project is done, I'll place these digests and more back up for your reference. :)

For now, I have placed in some of the other case digests that I'm not using at the moment.

Thursday, September 9, 2010