Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ruben Ayson and Felipe Ramos

07 July 1989                   

G.R. No. 85215

 

Ponente: Narvasa, J.

FACTS:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its Baguio City station.  The PAL manager sent him a letter regarding his involvement on the irregularities of the sales of plane tickets, wherein an investigation is to be made on 09 February 1986.  The day before the said investigation, Ramos sent a handwritten note to his superiors stating that he is willing to settle the said irregularities of approximately Php76,000.00.

In the said investigation done by the PAL Baguio Branch Manager, Edgardo Cruz in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Ramos agreed that his answers be taken down in writing.  Two months later, Ramos was charged with estafa allegedly committed from March 12, 1986 to January 29, 1987 to which Ramos entered a plea of “Not Guilty.”

The private prosecutors raised that the statements of Felipe Ramos taken on the investigation of 09 February 1986, together with his handwritten note, were confessions to the crime that the latter was being accused of.  The trial court judge dismissed the use of the said evidences since it does not appear that the accused was reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a counsel.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ramos was denied of his rights “not to be compelled to be a witness against himself” and “to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.”

HELD:

The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"

The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.  It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.

It should be noted that the following are the rights of a suspect in a crime:

·          BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police: the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and

·          AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT —

•     to refuse to be a witness;
•     not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
•     to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
•     WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.

It is clear from the facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation (that which is initiated by government officers under custody).  The constitutional rights of a person under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently filed against him, just as it is obvious that the note that he sent to his superiors on February 8, 1986, the day before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.

Respondent judge misapprehended the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in the Constitution.  His Orders were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion.  They should hereby be annulled and set aside. 

Case Notes:

·          The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It must be claimed. 

·          The objective of the Miranda Rights is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."