Case Digest: Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals And Alejo M. Vinluan

G.R. No. 102692   23 September 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

On several occasions in 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of Johnson & Johnson, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others.  The defendants, under the name and style of “Vinluan Enterprises,” thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates.  However, the checks were dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds.  Several extensions were given to the spouses to settle the obligation.  On 05 January 1983, the defendant spouses made a partial payment of P5,000.00, but made no further payments afterwards.  The trial court found that Alejo Vinluan, had no privity of contract, whether direct or indirect, regarding those obligations incurred by his wife, as he only became a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises after the obligations involved in this action had been incurred by Delilah.  In addition, said obligations were contracted without the husband’s knowledge or consent, and that the conjugal partnership never derived benefit therefrom.

The trial court decided that Alejo should not be held liable for the obligations incurred by his wife without his knowledge or consent.  However, when notices of levy on execution were issued, these covered not only Delilah’s exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. This has caused Alejo to file a third-party claim, which was denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the trial court denying private respondent’s third-party claim and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision which had long become final and executory.

HELD:

NO, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF DECIDING THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, REVERSE ITS FINAL DECISION.

In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the law provides that the debts and obligations contracted must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business.  The text of the trial court’s decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision.  And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that “the defendant-husband cannot, together, with the co-defendant legally be made liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.”

Case Digest: Consolacion Villanueva vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus Bernas And Remedios Q. Bernas

G.R. No. 74577                     04 December 1990

NARVASA, J.

FACTS:

Modesto and Frederico Aranas inherited Lot 13 from their parents, Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa.  Said lot was divided into a northern and southern portion (Lot 13-C) and was distributed between Frederico and Modesto, respectively. Modesto had two illegitimate children names Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas.  These two loaned from Jeusu Bernas an amount of P18,000.00 secured by Lot 13-C.  A Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage was executed between the siblings and Bernas wherein they described themselves as absolute co-owners of Lot 13.  Raymundo Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed the document as witnesses.

About a month later, Villanueva and Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas alleging that they be declared co-owners of the land based on the will of Victoria Comorro bequeathing to Villanueva and Aranas all of Comorro’s “interests, rights and properties, real and personal, x x as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas x x.”  Modesto Aranas’ will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria “as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage with his said wife.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not Consolacion Villanueva has any right over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last will and testament.

HELD:

NO, CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA DOES NOT BEAR ANY RIGHT OVER LOT 13-C AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.

Lot 13-C was not part of the conjugal partnership property of Comorro and Aranas.  It was the latter’s exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his parents and registered solely in his name.  It is inconsequential whether he acquired the property subsequent to his marriage to Comorroo for Article 148 of the Civil Code decrees that to be considered “the exclusive property of the spouse” is inter alia, “that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own,” or “that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.  Such is the case in Modesto’s acquisition of Lot 13-C.  Furthermore, the fact that Comorro died 2 years ahead of Aranas clearly signifies that she never inherited anything from her husband.

To claim for the improvements thereon, proof is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately.  No such proof was presented by Villanueva.

Case Digest: JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO ALEJO

G.R. No. 151967  ::  16 February 2005  ::  Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts:

Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential land and a house thereon.  The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.”  Eduardo had written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.  The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity of Eduardo.

When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of land owned by Josefina.  Before Josefina could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one Carmelita Carpio when the two were married.  Said annulment was granted by the RTC.

Issue:  

Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and can not be held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.

Held:

NO, THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT THE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF JOSEFINA AND CAN BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR EDUARDO’S OBLIGATIONS.

Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal for the cohabitation between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous, the latter failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such.  Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay for it.  Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.

Case Digest: REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115460  :: 15 March 1995  :: MELO, J.

Facts:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City.  Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.  Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer.  Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind Therese.  During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born.  The relationship soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California.  Because his assignment is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with her mother.  She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a “bad” man who worked for her father.  Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

Issue:  Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

Held:

NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF PARENT SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore.  As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines.  Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child.  From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Bienvenido Mara y Bolaqueña alias “Loloy”

G.R. No. 184050                08 May 2009                       

Ponente: Velasco, JR, J.

FACTS:

In the evening of the 27 February 1999, Marcelino Balos held a party at his house in Bukidnon.  As per the host, while seated at the table, the appellant suddenly hacked the victim, Gaudencio Perater, on the right side of his neck with a bolo.  According to Marcelino’s nephew, there were no words exchanged between the victim and the accused prior to the attack.

The appellant’s version states that Gaudencio was drinking with Marcelino and his nephew when the accused asked where his brother is.  Gaudencio insulted the appellant’s brother and where a fight ensued.  Upon being warned that Gaudencio was about to stab him, the appellant hit the victim’s neck in self-defense.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery should be appreciated; and
2. Whether the accused-appellant’s claim of self-defense should be appreciated.

RULING:

1.   Considering the sudden manner of the attack which was done in a party, leaving the victim’s guard down and defenseless, and the lack of provocation from the victim as testified by witnesses, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is to be appreciated.  The crime therefore is murder under paragraph 1 of Article 248 of the RPC.
2. For self-defense to occur, the defense must prove that there was (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation from the person claiming self-defense.  The first of these elements is required, and as there was only the appellant’s testimony that the victim was about to stab him as opposed to the testimonies by witnesses, it was found that the latter’s testimonies were more credible than that of the accused – that there was no attack coming from the victim’s end. Unlawful aggression is absent; thus, the accused-appellant’s claim for self-defense fails.

Reviewer: Classification of Banks

Based on the book Banking Laws and Jurisprudence by Efren L. Dizon and Efren Vincent M. Dizon.


Here's the DOWNLOAD LINK.


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Reviewer: Civil Code Preliminary Title

Sharing with you a reviewer on the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Book 1, encompassing the following topics:

• Effect and Application of Laws
• Human Relations

Just click on THIS DOWNLOAD LINK.

Hope this helps.

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Audio Codal: Negotiable Instruments Law Part 2

Sorry, it took forever. Here's the second part of the audio codal for the Negotiable Instruments Law.


Negotiable Instruments Law: Sections 24-40


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Reviewer: Obligations and Contracts

For those who are taking up Obligations and Contracts, I hope you find these helpful.


If you cannot download via the link, copy and paste the URL to the address bar of your browser window.


General Provisions [Introductory topics] - http://www.4shared.com/document/hKGdXFNX/OBLICON_Reviewer_-_Obligations.html


Natural Obligations and Estoppel - http://www.4shared.com/document/_mSARonG/Oblicon_Reviewer_-_Natural_Obl.html


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Case Digest: Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul Manglapus

G.R. No. 88211

15 September 1989

En Banc

FACTS:

After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile.  Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.  But President Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: 

Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated under scope of the Executive are concerned.

RULING:

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of the “executive power.” Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution.  Having sword to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.  It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for common good.  The State, through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct.

Case Digest: Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito G. Arcialla vs. Salvador Mison and Guillermo Carague

No. L-79974        December 17, 1987

En Banc

FACTS:

When Salvador Mison was appointed to the Office of the Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, this petition for prohibition filed by taxpayers, lawyers, members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional was filed on the grounds that said appointment is in violation of Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for it was not approved by the Commission on Appointments.

ISSUE:  Whether said appointment is indeed unconstitutional basing on Section 16, Article VII.

RULING:

Mison’s appointment is constitutional.  Sec. 16, Article VII states that:

“Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. x x x”

It is clear that the first group shall need the confirmation of the CoA.  Also, it can be seen from reviewing the records of deliberation of the 1986 Constitutional Commission that it has been clearly stated that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the confirmation of the CoA.  In the issue at hand, it is evident that the position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the CoA is required. 

Furthermore, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs under Sec. 601 of R.A. 1937 which states that “Sec. 601. – x x x The Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner of Customs shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines.”

Reviewer: Justifying Circumstances

Sharing another reviewer.  This time it's on Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code on Justifying
Circumstances.


You can download it HERE.

Hard-to-Find Case (Full Text): Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals

1950 September 25                                                                            En Banc

G.R. No. L-2516                                                                    D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.:

For having issued a rubber check, Ang Tek Lian was convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.

It appears that, knowing he had no funds therefor, Ang Tek Lian drew on Saturday, November 16, 1946, the check Exhibit A upon the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of "cash". He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act. On November 18, 1946, the next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit of Ang Tek Lian on both dates being P335 only.

The Court of Appeals believed the version of Lee Huan Hong who testified that "on November 16, 1946, appellant went to his (complainant's) office, at 1217 Herran, Paco, Manila, and asked him to exchange Exhibit A - which he (appellant) then brought with him - with cash alleging that he needed badly the sum of P4,000 represented by the check, but could not withdraw it from the bank, it being then already closed; that in view of this request and relying upon appellant's assurance that he had sufficient funds in the bank to meet Exhibit A, and because they used to borrow money from each other, even before the war, and appellant owns a hotel and restaurant known as the North Bay Hotel, said complainant delivered to him, on the same date, the sum of P4,000 in cash; that despite repeated efforts to notify him that the check had been dishonored by the bank, appellant could not be located any-where, until he was summoned in the City Fiscal's Office in view of the complaint for estafa filed in connection therewith; and that appellant has not paid as yet the amount of the check, or any part thereof."

Inasmuch as the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final, the only question of law for decision is whether under the facts found, estafa had been accomplished.

Article 315, paragraph (d), subsection 2 of the Revised Penal Code, punishes swindling committed "By post-dating a check, or issuing such check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances."

We believe that under this provision of law Ang Tek Lian was properly held liable. In this connection, it must be stated that, as explained in People vs. Fernandez (59 Phil., 615), estafa is committed by issuing either a postdated check or an ordinary check to accomplish the deceit.

It is argued, however, that as the check had been made payable to "cash" and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged. Based on the proposition that "by uniform practice of all banks in the Philippines a check so drawn is invariably dishonored," the following line of reasoning is advanced in support of the argument:

". . . When, therefore, he (the offended party) accepted the check (Exhibit A) from the appellant, he did so with full knowledge that it would be dishonored upon presentment. In that sense, the appellant could not be said to have acted fraudulently because the complainant, in so accepting the check as it was drawn, must be considered, by every rational consideration, to have done so fully aware of the risk he was running thereby." (Brief for the appellant, p. 11.)

We are not aware of the uniformity of such practice. Instances have undoubtedly occurred wherein the Bank required the indorsement of the drawer before honoring a check payable to "cash." But cases there are too, where no such requirement had been made. It depends upon the circumstances of each transaction.

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement.

"A check payable to the order of cash is a bearer instrument. Bacal vs. National City Bank of New York (1933), 146 Misc., 732; 262 N. Y. S., 839; Cleary vs. Da Beck Plate Glass Co. (1907), 54 Misc., 537; 104 N. Y. S., 831; Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. vs. Pittsburgh Pipe & Supply Co. (Tex. Civ. App., 1939), 135 S. W. (2d), 818. See also H. Cook & Son vs. Moody (1916), 17 Ga. App., 465; 87 S. E., 713."

"Where a check is made payable to the order of 'cash', the word cash 'does not purport to be the name of any person', and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not obtain any indorsement of the check, but may pay it to the person presenting it without any indorsement. . . ." (Zollmann, Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 6, p. 494.)

Of course, if the bank is not sure of the bearer's identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification and/or assurance against possible complications, - for instance, (a) forgery of drawer's signature, (b) loss of the check by the rightful owner, (c) raising of the amount payable, etc. The bank may therefore require, for its protection, that the indorsement of the drawer - or of some other person known to it - be obtained. But where the Bank is satisfied of the identity and/or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection, it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting.

"A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder. Where a check is in the ordinary form, and is payable to bearer, so that no indorsement is required, a bank, to which it is presented for payment, need not have the holder identified, and is not negligent in failing to do so. . . ." (Michie on Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 5, p. 343.)

". . . Consequently, a drawee bank to which a bearer check is presented for payment need not necessarily have the holder identified and ordinarily may not be charged with negligence in failing to do so. See Opinions 6C:2 and 6C:3. If the bank has no reasonable cause for suspecting any irregularity, it will be protected in paying a bearer check, 'no matter what facts unknown to it may have occurred prior to the presentment.' 1 Morse, Banks and Banking, sec. 393.

"Although a bank is entitled to pay the amount of a bearer check without further inquiry, it is entirely reasonable for the bank to insist that the holder give satisfactory proof of his identity . . .." (Paton's Digest, Vol. I, p. 1089.)

Anyway, it is significant, and conclusive, that the form of the check Exhibit A was totally unconnected with its dishonor. The Court of Appeals declared that it was returned unsatisfied because the drawer had insufficient funds - not because the drawer's indorsement was lacking.

Wherefore, there being no question as to the correctness of the penalty imposed on the appellant, the writ of certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396                03 May 2006                              Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same.  She did so citing the following bases:

• The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
• Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.  It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

• February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
• February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20^th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
• February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.  Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.  The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.  However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
• The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

• Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20^th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
• Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
• Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1. The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.  During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  An otherwise moot case may still be decided “provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance” (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so.  As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily.  It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.  Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, the “acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.  The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.  A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in one’s presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge – both of which are not present in David’s warrantless arrest.  This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”  Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing.   In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Audio Codal: Negotiable Instruments Law Part 1

For all you auditory learners over there! Just click on the download links.


Negotiable Instruments Law : Sections 1 to 10


Negotiable Instruments Law : Sections 11-23




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Thank You!

I just checked my blog stats after a very, very long time, and I saw that it shot waaaaay up since this semester started.  I'd like to say a BIG THANK YOU for the readers and the followers.


I'll be updating this blog as soon as I can.  If you guys have a specific topic or case that you would want to see here, just let me know by leaving a comment in any of the blog posts.


Again, thanks and remember: you have to want it to get it! :)


God bless!

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Corpuz y Simon

G.R. No. 175836                30 January 2009

FACTS:

For several months, the victim, a minor below 18 years of age, had been raped multiple times by herein appellant who is the live-in partner of the victim’s mother.  He would do so with threats that he would kill the victim and her mother if she would not succumb to his desires.  The victim kept the incidents to herself until she noticed that her menstruation stopped, fearing pregnancy.  It was found through examinations that the victim had old hymenal lacerations.  The appellant admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that he never used force.

ISSUE:

Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship is to be appreciated in favour of the victim in order to qualify said offense from simple rape to qualified rape.

RULING:

To obtain qualified rape, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the Information and proved with certainty.  Minority had been alleged and proved.  The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victim’s mother and the accused contracted marriage.  The prosecution, however, did not present proof to support this.  What appellant claimed is that he and the victim’s mother were merely common-law spouses, which would also qualify the offense.  Since no proof on the relationship was alleged in the Information, simple rape cannot be qualified.  Therefore, it was held that appellant committed six counts of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua. 

Case Digest: Northwestern University, Inc. vs. Arquillo

02 August 2005
Ponente: Panganiban, J.


FACTS:


Ben A. Nicolas, in behalf of Northwestern University, filed a letter-complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines allegedly reporting that Atty. Macario Arquillo had engaged in conflicting interest by acting as counsel for both complainant and respondent in the very same consolidated case filed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Respondent claims that there is no conflict-of-interests as all parties are said to be on the same side.


For failing to appear in scheduled hearings, Atty. Arquillo is deemed to have waived his right to participate in the proceedings.


ISSUE:


Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:


Yes. 


 The Court held that Atty. Arquillo is guilty of violating the conflict-of-interests rule under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires lawyers to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Therefore, a lawyer may not represent conflicting interests without the written consent of all parties involved, after disclosure of the facts. The Court did not agree with Arquillo’s justification of his acts for he should have known that in representing opposing parties, there would be an obvious conflict of interest, regardless of his belief that both parties are on the same side.


Atty. Macario Arquillo was found guilty of misconduct and was hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.

Case Digest: Re: Anonymous Complaint Against Judge Edmundo T. Acuna, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City, Branch 123

28 July 2005

Ponente: Callejo, Sr., J.

FACTS:

Concerned citizens of the lower court filed an anonymous letter to the Office of the Court Administrator reporting the alleged malpractices of Judge Edmundo Acuna.  Among these are his regular use of expletives and insulting terms such as “putang ina” and “putris,” and his constant berating and embarrassment of people in front of others. It was also reported that he conducted trials and filed decisions for five criminal cases while he was on official leave from the 15^th of August to the 15^th of September 2001.

The respondent contended that these allegations were exaggerated and the only purpose of which is to harass him, and that part of his odd behaviours that may seem unacceptable to his colleagues were brought about by his mourning due to the loss of his son which was amplified by the poor performance ratings of his staff.  Although he did admit to using such offensive terms, respondent averred that these were not directed to anyone in particular.  He also stated in his defense that while he was issued an Authority to Travel dated 14^th of August 2011 to travel to Canada, he still presented evidence on his entries in the daily time records that he was not yet on leave from the 15^th to the 21^st of August 2011.  He thus had the right and duty to come to court as the case may be.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent’s behaviour and issuance of decisions while on official leave are subject to disciplinary actions.

HELD:

Yes.  The Court held that the use of such expletives is improper for the lauded office of a magistrate of the law.  As the public expects more from such a high and respectable office, the same level of expectation is also placed upon the person who holds it to uphold its respectability and be conscious of his acts in order to maintain its honourability.  A judge is expected to be temperate, patient and courteous in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiability of the judiciary.  As held in Ignacio and Valenzuela, a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities, to which herein respondent is guilty of.

Furthermore, the Court agrees with the Investigating Judge that overzealousness to work is not a shield from administrative liability for the dire consequences that may effect from the result of his decisions and orders issued while he was supposed to be on official leave.

As Judge Acuna was found guilty of impropriety, he is reprimanded and is sternly warned that repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

Case Digest: Quirino Tomlin II vs. Atty. Salvador N. Moya II

23 February 2006

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS:

Atty. Salvador Moya II allegedly issued seven postdated checks to Quirino Tomlin II as partial payment for the P600,000.00 that the former borrowed from the latter.  When Tomlin realized that all the said checks were dishonoured by the bank, he made several demands to Moya but the latter still refused to pay his debt.  Thereafter, the complainant filed seven counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 to the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan as well as an instant case for disbarment against Moya.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the administrative case for the respondent’s disbarment should be dismissed for violation of the rule on non-forum shopping; and
2. Whether or not Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation or the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:

1. No.  The instant petition for disbarment was not a violation of the rule against forum shopping.  Forum shopping is only applicable to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.  Furthermore, the main object of the seven criminal cases of the respondent’s violation of BP Blg. 22 is different from the administrative case at hand.  The former refers to the issuance of bouncing checks, while the latter refers to the dishonesty of the respondent in the payment of his debts.
2. Yes.  Atty. Moya is guilty of Gross Misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.  His refusal to pay his monetary obligations His refusal to pay his monetary obligations without justifiable cause, despite acknowledging said obligations and doing so without remorse, fails to comply with the expectation of lawyers to be honest in their dealings – be it in their professional or private affairs.  What is more, his failure to file his answer and verified position paper despite extensions of time is a manifestation of his disrespect for judicial authorities.  For his acts, he was then sentenced to be suspended from practice for two years.

Case Digest: Carmelita I. Zaguirre vs. Atty. Alfredo Castillo

03 August 2005    Per Curiam

FACTS:

Atty. Alfredo Castillo was already married with three children when he had an affair with Carmelita Zaguirre.  This occurred sometime from 1996 to 1997, while Castillo was reviewing for the bar and before the release of its results.  Zaguirre then got pregnant allegedly with Castillo’s daughter.  The latter, who was already a lawyer, notarized an affidavit recognizing the child and promising for her support which did not materialize after the birth of the child.  The Court found him guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct to which Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration.

The IBP commented that until Castillo admits the paternity of the child and agrees to support her.  In his defense, the latter presented different certificates appreciating his services as a lawyer and proving his good moral character.  His wife even submitted a handwritten letter stating his amicability as a husband and father despite the affair.  More than a year since the original decision rendered by the Court, Castillo reiterated his willingness to support the child to the Court and attached a photocopy of post-dated checks addressed to Zaguirre for the months of March to December 2005 in the amount of Php2,000.00 each.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo is guilty of Gross Immoral Conduct and should be punished with the penalty of Indefinite Suspension.

HELD:

The Court found that Castillo’s show of repentance and active service to the community is a just and reasonable ground to convert the original penalty of indefinite suspension to a definite suspension of two years.  Furthermore, the Court noted that Zaguirre’s further claim for the support of her child should be addressed to the proper court in a proper case.

Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Gayeta y Roblo alias “Freddie”

G.R. No. 171654                17 December 2008

Ponente: Torres, Jr., J.

FACTS:

While spouses Benjamin and Conchita were drinking tuba in their home, two armed men barged into their house and declared a hold-up who were later identified as herein appellant and one Reano.  Benjamin was kicked and boxed until the latter bled and lost consciousness, by which Conchita surrendered P2,500.  The two armed men then left and barged into another couple’s home and demanded them for money.  The wife, accompanied by the appellant, went to their store to get money.  In the store, the appellant forced the wife to have sexual intercourse with him.  After they had returned to their home, she told her husband that she had been sexually abused.  The husband had an altercation with the two perpetrators which resulted in him being hit on the shoulder with a bullet.

The two denied that they took part in the crime claiming that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the crime for Gayeta was in Muntinlupa doing his rounds as a member of the Voluntary Lakas Brigade, while Reano was in another town.

ISSUE:  

Whether the accused was guilty of the crimes of robbery and robbery with rape with his presentation of the Voluntary Lakas logbook.

RULING:

The inherently weak alibi presented by the accused does not hold a stronger bearing as compared to the positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses which is given full faith by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals.  Furthermore, presented logbook was neither authenticated nor identified by the persons who supposedly issued them. 

The aggravating circumstance of dwelling was properly appreciated in both robbery and robbery with rape.  There being no evidence to show that the accused purposely sought nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense, this circumstance was ruled out.  The original penalty of death is therefore reduced to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole.