Case Digest: PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

G.R. No. 82606     18 December 1992

CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

Jose Jo, herein respondent, admits to having cohabited with three different women and fathered fifteen children.  The first of these women, Prima Partosa, claims to be his legal wife by who he begot a daughter, Monina Jo.  The petitioner filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation of conjugal property to which the RTC of Negros Occidental ruled in favour of Prima as regards to support but none is mentioned in the dispositive portion of its decision regarding the judicial separation of conjugal property.  Upon elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the separation of conjugal property sought was allowed under Articles 175, 178, 191 of the Civil Code
2. Whether or not there is such a separation decreed by the trial court  in the dispositive portion of its decision

HELD:

1. YES, THE SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY IS ALLOWED UNDER THE SAID ARTICLES.

The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.  The fact that she was not accepted by Jose demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.  Furthermore, Jose refused to provide financial support to the petitioner.

2. YES, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION IN QUESTION WAS INCOMPLETE INSOFAR AS IT CARRIED NO RULING ON THE COMPLAINT FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY.

However, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over considerations of substantive justice.  The trial court made definite findings that the Jose and Prima were legally married and that the properties mentioned by Prima were acquired by Jose during their married although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.  As there is no question that the trial court’s decision is based on the said facts, the Supreme Court then modified the decision to grant the prayer of the plaintiff on the conjugal property’s division between the spouses.

Case Digest: Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz

No. L-19565          30 January 1968

Castro, J.

FACTS:

On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City.  During their union, six (6) children were born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3) parcels of land from Silay Cadastre were acquired.  These lands were assessed at P45,429 and P43,580, respectively.  The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957.  Aside from these properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied businesses and subdivisions.

On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband had not only abandoned her, but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership properties.  According to Estrella, since 1955, Severino had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had lived in his office and thereafter had been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.  This was supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found hidden in the pocket of her husband’s polo shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter.  When confronted, Severino denied of abandoning his wife and children.  He reasoned that he was only living in his office to teach a lesson to his quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife.  He further averred that he never failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts ranging from P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, the assistant general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory. 

Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to inform her of the status of their various business concerns.  She further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an abuse of administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties.  However, no evidence from the plaintiff was presented.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law and would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
2. Whether the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets?

HELD:

1. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT. 

The Court held that the plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership properties under Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real abandonment and not mere separation.  The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.  Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.  The Court further believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from the conjugal home, as shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his family.  Furthermore, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether Severino kept Nenita as a concubine.  Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by her testimony that she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting before.

2. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION OVER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.

There is no evidence on the record to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets.  The refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute in abuse.  

Case Digest: JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA

G.R. No. 109557   29 November 2000

PARDO, J.

FACTS:

On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. suffered from a stroke which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties.  He is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and the husband of herein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza.  Gilda signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties and also alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses are piling up.  For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements.  Said incapacity of Ernesto Sr. was affirmed by the RTC of Iloilo City, and Gilda was authorized to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.

Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgement and questioned the property sale of Lot No. 4291, stating that the market value of the property would be around 12 to 15 million pesos, but had been sold to Gilda’s daughter, Glenda Uy for only 8 million pesos.  He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to his father’s industry, labor and service, and further argues that the conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations in the form of cash and stocks which can off-set against the cost of medical and hospital bills.  Furthermore, Ernesto Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on instalment basis and that his two attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, rendering him comatose, could manage their conjugal property and may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose a parcel of land with its improvements to her own daughter and son-in-law.

HELD:

The proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code contemplate a situation where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.  These rules do not apply in cases where the spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.  A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure of the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under the Revised Rules of Court. 

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.  Absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio.  A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.

Case Digest: Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals And Alejo M. Vinluan

G.R. No. 102692   23 September 1996

PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

On several occasions in 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of Johnson & Johnson, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others.  The defendants, under the name and style of “Vinluan Enterprises,” thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates.  However, the checks were dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds.  Several extensions were given to the spouses to settle the obligation.  On 05 January 1983, the defendant spouses made a partial payment of P5,000.00, but made no further payments afterwards.  The trial court found that Alejo Vinluan, had no privity of contract, whether direct or indirect, regarding those obligations incurred by his wife, as he only became a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises after the obligations involved in this action had been incurred by Delilah.  In addition, said obligations were contracted without the husband’s knowledge or consent, and that the conjugal partnership never derived benefit therefrom.

The trial court decided that Alejo should not be held liable for the obligations incurred by his wife without his knowledge or consent.  However, when notices of levy on execution were issued, these covered not only Delilah’s exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. This has caused Alejo to file a third-party claim, which was denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the trial court denying private respondent’s third-party claim and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision which had long become final and executory.

HELD:

NO, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF DECIDING THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, REVERSE ITS FINAL DECISION.

In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the law provides that the debts and obligations contracted must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business.  The text of the trial court’s decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision.  And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that “the defendant-husband cannot, together, with the co-defendant legally be made liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.”