Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99         19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.  After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary.  Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal.  The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case. 

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day  The Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied.  Despite said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.  Due to the loss of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals.  Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives.  The letters specifically cited the Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts.  The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.  On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.  The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.       Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2.       Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.

HELD:

1.    Yes.  The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.  Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.  Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila.  It is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.  A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code.  These requisites were not complied with by the Union.  Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members are bound to.  To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend DOLE hearings.  The Union members should know from common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses.  In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.

Case Digest: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913                08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as guidance counselor.  In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.

They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and premature.  They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required under the law.  In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed evident bad faith. 

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.  Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.  It further held that the Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.  The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents.  However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September 2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA.  It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law.  In so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.  Petitioner’s intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to the deadline set by law.  The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause to the school’d operation is only trivial. 
2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March 2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos.  The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not timely comply with the requirements set by law.

Case Digest: Mattel, Inc. vs. Emma Francisco, et al.

Petitioner’s Claims:

Mattel, Inc. alleges that Uy’s “Barbie” trademark of confectionary products was confusingly similar to its trademark on dolls, doll clothes and doll accessories.  Mattel argues that its products are items related to Uy’s products; hence, identical trademarks should not be used where the possibility of confusion as to source or origin of the products is certain and that by adopting an exactly identical mark, in spelling and style, Uy should be presumed to have intended to cash in or ride on the goodwill and widespread recognition enjoyed by Mattel’s mark.

Respondents’ Claims:

Jimmy Uy contends that there is no similarity between the two goods.  Emma Francisco, the Director General of IPO, stated that there was no proof on record that Mattel had ventured into the production of chocolates and confectionary products under the trademark “Barbie” to enable it to prevent Uy from using an identical “Barbie” trademark on said goods.  On the other hand, Uy submits that the case has become moot and academic since the records of the IPO will show that no DAU was filed on or before 01 December 2001; thus he is deemed to have abandoned his trademark application.

Issue:

Whether or not the case has become moot and academic

Ruling:

Yes. According to Section 124.2 of RA 8293, the applicant shall file a declaration of actual use of the mark with evidence to that effect with three years from filing date of the application.  Otherwise, the applicant shall be refused.  Moreover, the issues in the present case call for an appraisal of factual considerations which are peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.  The issues raised in this case do not call for a clarification unlike in the cases of David vs. Arroyo, Constantino vs. Sandiganbayan and others.  In the latter cases, moot and academic issues were still decided for these pertain to important and transcendental constitutional issues, which are not in line with this case.

Case Digest: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.

G.R. No. 133495                03 September 1998

Doctrine:  It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to apply.

FACTS:

Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja.  On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995.  On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years.  On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections.  However, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:  Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:

No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.  The purposes of said limitation are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of enhancing the freedom of the choice of people.  Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.  To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.