Case Digest: HON. RAMON BAGATSING, et al. vs. HON. PEDRO A. RAMIREZ and FEDERATION OF MANILA MARKET VENDORS, INC.

G.R. No. L-41631               17 December 1976

MARTIN, J.

FACTS:

Sometime in 1974, the Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7522, “An Ordinance Regulating the Operation of Public Markets and Prescribing Fees for the Rentals of Stalls and Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes.” City Mayor Bagatsing approved the ordinance 3 days later.

On 17 February 1975, respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced a civil case before the CFI of Manila seeking declaration of the said ordinance mainly because the publication requirement under the Charter of Manila has not been complied with. Judge Ramirez rendered its decision declaring the nullity of the ordinance on the primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of publication under the City Charter, which requires the ordinance to be published in two daily newspapers of general circulation in the city before its enactment.  Neither was it published after its approval, although it was posed in the legislative hall and in all city public markets and city public libraries.

For the petitioners’ part, they claim that only a post-publication is required under the Local Tax Code.

ISSUE: 

What law shall govern the publication of a tax ordinance enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila, the Revised City Charter, which requires publication of the ordinance before its enactment and after its approval, or the Local Tax Code, which only demands publication after its approval?

HELD:

There is no question that the Revised Charter of the City of Manila is a special act, whereas the Local Tax Code is a general law because it applies universally to all LGUs.  The rule commonly said is that the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered.  However, the rule yields to a situation where the special statute refers to a subject in general which the general statute treats in particular.  This exactly is the circumstance in this case. The Revised Charter of the City of Manila refers merely to “ordinances,” while the Local Tax Code refers to “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other charges” in particular. Thus, in the realm of “ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other charges” the Local Tax Code governs.  This is especially true since the Local Tax Code was enacted later than the Charter

Case Digest: RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al. vs. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY

G.R. No. L-66683 23 April 1990

FACTS:

On January 4, 1984, private respondent PLDT filed an application with respondent Commission for the Approval of Rates for Digital Transmission Service Facilities. The NTC and the Public Service Commission granted the same provisionally for 30 days.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the NTC and the Public Service Commission can grant provisional rates without informing herein petitioners.

RULING:

Yes. Well-settled is the rule that the Public Service Commission now is empowered to approve provisionally rates of utilities without the necessity of a prior hearing. Under the Public Service Act, as amended (CA No. 146), the Board of Communications then, now the NTC, can fix a provisional amount for the subscriber's investment to be effective immediately, without hearing (par. 3 of Sec. 16, CA 146, as amended). Further, the Public Service Act makes no distinction between initial or revised rates. These rates are necessarily proposed merely, until the Commission approves them. Moreover, the Commission can hear and approve revised rates without published notices or hearing. The reason is easily discerned from the fact that provisional rates are by their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after final hearing 

Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA

G.R. No. 121777 24 January 2001

FACTS:

Dela Piedra was charged with illegal recruitment in a large scale. In an information filed against her, without any POEA license, she allegedly offered and promised for a fee employment in Singapore to Modesto, Amanita and Timbol, such that Modesto had already advanced the amount of Php2,000.00. Dela Piedra was arrested in her home after an investigation was made by Atty. Erlina Ramos, a lawyer of the POEA, who pretended to be an applicant, which led to an entrapment operation of the PNP-CIS for Region IX.

ISSUES:

1. Is Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement void for vagueness?
2. Whether herein appellant committed the crime of large scale illegal recruitment.

RULING:

1. NO. Section 13(b) is not overbroad. It encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral.
2. NO. A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only two persons, Amanita and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by the appellant.

Case Digest: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. DOMINGO PANIS and SERAPIO ABUG

G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 11 July 1990

FACTS:

Four informations were filed in the CFI of Zamboanga City alleging that Serapio Abug, “without securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as holder of authority did then and there operate a fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses and promising employment in Saudi Arabia”

ISSUE: 

Whether all the acts mentioned in Article 13(b) of PD 442 are indispensable requirements in order to constitute illegal recruitment and placement.

RULING:

NO. Article 13(b) states that “Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement”.

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient in the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(B) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.

Case Digest: STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC., and CHUNG GAI SHIP MANAGEMENT vs. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO, JR.

G.R. No. 177498 18 January 2012

FACTS:

Medequillo filed a complaint before the POEA against the petitioners for illegal dismissal and failure to deploy. On 06 November 1991, he was hired by Stolt Nielsen on behalf of its principal Chung-Gai Management on board the vessel Stolt Aspiration. While the vessel was docked at MV Stolt Aspiration, he joined the crew for nearly three months. However, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and he was repatriated back to Manila for no reason or explanation.

He was transferred to Stolt Pride under a second contract, with approval of the POEA. Despite the commencement of the second contract, he was not deployed despite follow-ups from Medequillo. When he sought for the return of his passport, seaman’s book and other papers, he was made to sign a document that he cannot seek for employment with other agencies.

LABOR ARBITER: The Labor Arbiter found that Medequillo was constructively dismissed. He found that the first contract entered into by and between the petitioner and Medequillo had been novated by the second contract. Petitioners appealed that Medequillo cannot be considered as having been illegally dismissed because he had not even been deployed yet.

NLRC: The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified terminal

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not the first employment contract between the petitioner and Medequillo is separate and distinct from the second one.
2. What is the consequence of the non-deployment of the respondent?

RULING:

1. YES. With the finding that respondent was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with the petitioners on the second contract, novation became an unavoidable conclusion.
2. The POEA Standard Employment Conract provides that employment shall commence upon the actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire. Thus, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of the respondent while on board the first ship cannot be sustained to justify non-deployment. Under the POEA Rules, failure of an agency to deploy a worker within the prescribed period without valid reasons shall be a cause for the suspension or cancellation of license or fine.