Case Digest: Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 163217                18 April 2006

FACTS:

On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from Santos’ house.  At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot.  Artemio had been shot on the chest.  He shouted at Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.)  Lito saw a man running away from the direction of Artemio’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face.  Artemio’s wife, Ernita, came running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the ground and bloodied.  She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise.  Ernita shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)

Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople.  He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP.  To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s store.  Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him because of the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s family, but he could not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence. 

During the trial of the case, Ernita positively identified Marturillas as her husband’s assailant.  This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ testimony and expert witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle.  However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.

RULING:

Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one “running away” immediately after the sound of a gunshot.  Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running.  She also clarified that she had heard the statement, “help me pre, I was shot by the captain.”  The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the CA that Ernita’s testimony is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house.  The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features.  Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.  Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics.  Settled is the rule that on questions of credibility of witnesses and veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by Ernita.  He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.

Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.  Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.  These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.  All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case: 

1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 

2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 

3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.  

Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.

Case Digest: Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines

 G.R. No. 176389                14 December 2010

FACTS:

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City.  Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime.  It presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime.  She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits.  She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.  Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.  Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution to its success.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.

In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence.  After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela.  Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the United States.  He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992.  As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA.  Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.

RULING:

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:

1. The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
2. The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.  She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.  She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.  And although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.  She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that:

1. He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb.  This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused.  For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold altogether.  Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.

Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.

Case Digest: TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TPCWA) vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al.

G.R. Nos 158798-99         19 October 2007

FACTS:

The Union is the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Toyota rank and file employees.  After the holding of a certification election, and the issuance of an Order certifying the Union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the Toyota rank and file employees, Toyota challenged said Order via appeal to the DOLE Secretary.  Thus, Toyota refused to negotiate CBAs with the Union pending said appeal.  The Union’s subsequent notice to strike was converted into a preventive mediation case. 

The 21 February 2001 hearing on the exclusion of the votes of alleged supervisory employees from the votes cast during the certification election was cancelled and reset to the next day  The Union requested that its members be absent on 22 February, but the same was denied.  Despite said denal, more than 200 employees staged mass actions on 22 and 23 February in front of the BLR and DOLE offices, to protest the partisan and anti-union stance of Toyota.  Due to the loss of the said number of employees, Toyota experienced losses due to inability to meet production goals.  Soon thereafter, Toyota sent individual letters to some 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directives.  The letters specifically cited the Company’s Code of Conduct wherein “inciting or participating in riots, disorders, alleged strikes, or concerted actions detrimental to Toyota’s interest” wherein the first offense would amount to dismissal.

In response to the letters, the Union circulated a Manifesto which urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts.  The Union members explained that their refusal to work on their scheduled work time for two consecutive days was simply an exercise of their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances.  On 16 March 2001, Toyota terminated 227 employees for participation in concerted actions in violation of its Code of Conduct and for misconduct under Article 282 of the Labor Code.  In reaction to the dismissal of its union members and officers, the Union went on strike on 17 March, 28 March ad 12 April. In the latter dates, the Union intensified its strike by barricading the gates of Toyota’s Bicutan and Sta. Rosa plants.  The strikers prevented workers who reported for work from entering the plants.

ISSUE(S):

1.       Whether the mass actions committed by the Union on different occasions are illegal strikes; and

2.       Whether separation pay should be awarded to the Union members who participated in the illegal strikes.

HELD:

1.    Yes.  The alleged protest rallies in front of the offices of BLR and DOLE Secretary and at the Toyota plants constituted illegal strikes.  Even if the Union claims that the said acts were not strikes, there was a lack of permit from the City of Manila to hold “rallies”, nor were there any filing of a notice in the two-day walk-out.  Shrouded by demonstrations, they were in reality temporary stoppages of work perpetrated through the converted action of the employees who deliberately failed to report for work on the convenient excuse that they will hold a rally at the BLR and DOLE offices in Intramuros, Manila.  It is obvious that the real and ultimate goal of the Union is to coerce Toyota to finally acknowledge the Union as the sole bargaining agent of the company.  This is not a legal and valid exercise of the right of assembly and to demand redress of grievance.  A valid strike should comply with the prerequisites under Article 263 of the Labor Code.  These requisites were not complied with by the Union.  Furthermore, the February 2001 strikes are in blatant violation of Toyota’s Code of Conduct to which the Union and its members are bound to.  To make matters worse, the barricade done during the March and April strikes are in palpable violation of Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, which proscribes acts of violence, coercion, or intimidation, or which obstruct the free ingress to and egress from the company premises.
2. No. There can be no good faith in intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work just to attend DOLE hearings.  The Union members should know from common sense that the company will incur substantial amounts of losses.  In a slew of cases, the Court refrained from awarding separation pay or financial assistance to union officers and members who were separated from service due to their participation in or commission of illegal acts during strikes.

Case Digest: ST. MARY’S ACADEMY OF DIPOLOG CITY vs. TERESITA PALACIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 164913                08 September 2010

FACTS:

In the 1990s, Petitioner hired Respondents Calibod, Laquio, Santander, Saile Padilla, Andalahao, Decipulo and Montederamos, as teachers, and respondent Palacio as guidance counselor.  In accordance to DECS Memorandum No. 10, S. 1998 pursuant to RA 7836, the Petitioner informed the respondents that they cannot be re-accepted for the school year 2000-2001 for not having passed the LET (Licensure Examinations for Teachers), nor can they continue with their teaching profession.

They filed a complaint contesting that their termination as highly irregular and premature.  They averred their right to security of tenure despite the requirements set by the PRC for they had special permits to teach and the civil service eligibility required under the law.  In addition to this, the deadline for teachers to register under the Memorandum was set to 19 September 2000, but the petitioner decided to terminate them as early as 31 March 2000. Lastly, the acceptance of the Petitioner of other teacher who do not also possess the required eligibility under the Memorandum showed evident bad faith. 

LA Decision:

The LA adjudged the petitioner guilty of illegal dismissal.  Thus, petitioner was ordered to reinstate the respondents or to pay them separation pay at the rate of ½ month wage for every year of service, plus limited backwages.

NLRC Decision:

The NLRC upheld the LA’s decision, stating that the grounds relied upon by the petitioner or dismiss the respondents are not among those enumerated by the Labor Code and that the respondents are regular employees, who cannot be removed without just cause.

CA Decision:

The CA upheld both the decisions of the LA and the NLRC.  It further held that the Petitioner should have adopted a contingency plan if in case the respondents still have not complied with the aforementioned requirements when the deadline has arrived.  The CA also observed that the petitioner’s ulterior motive for the termination may have been the result of a confrontation between the principal and the respondents.  However, as regards to Padilla, Palacio, Andalahao and Decipulo, the CA found them to be merely probationary; therefore, there is no illegal dismissal to speak of.

ISSUE(S):

1. Whether the dismissal of the respondents were premature because it was effected prior to the deadline set by the PRC to acquire their license.
2. Whether the respondents are entitled to backwages from March to 19 September 2000, because it is only on such date that they were already dismissible for cause.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court agrees with the decisions of the LA, the NLRC and the CA.  It is incumbent upon the Court to afford full protection to labor.The law has provided a specific timeframe within which respondents could comply, petitioner has no right to deny them of this privilege accorded to them by law.  In so far as Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montedramos are concerned, being dismissed on March 2000 was premature.  However, Saile is not qualified to take the LET, therefore, no prematurity is to speak of on her end.  Petitioner’s intention and desire not to put the students’ education and school operation in jeopardy is neither a decisive consideration for respondents’ termination prior to the deadline set by law.  The prejudice that respondents’ retention would cause to the school’d operation is only trivial. 
2. Yes. The respondents are entitled to limited backwages computed from 31 March 2000 to September 2000 in favor of Palacio, Calibod, Laquio, Santander and Montederamos.  The Petitioner cannot possibly presume that respondents could not timely comply with the requirements set by law.