Monday, February 11, 2013

Case Digest: BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.


BENJAMIN U. BORJA, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSE T. CAPCO, JR.
G.R. No. 133495                03 September 1998

Doctrine:  It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office – he must have also been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification to apply.

FACTS:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 1988 for a term ending on June 1992. On September 1989, he became mayor by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent. Cesar Borja.  On May 1992, he ran and was elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on June 1995.  On May 1995, he was reelected mayor for another term of three years.  On March 1998, he filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 1998 elections.  However, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:  Whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of a law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.

HELD:
No. According to the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the limitation provided for under Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code only refer to such officials running for the same position in the succeeding election following the expiration of the third consecutive term.  The purposes of said limitation are to prevent the establishment of political dynasties and that of enhancing the freedom of the choice of people.  Indeed, a fundamental tenet of representative democracy is that the people would be allowed to choose those whom they please to govern them.  To bar the election of a local official because he has already served three terms, although the first as a result of succession by operation of law rather than election, would therefore be to violate this principle.

Wednesday, February 6, 2013

Case Digest: ORTIGAS & CO. vs. FEATI BANK


ORTIGAS & CO. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP vs. FEATI BANK AND TRUST CO.

G.R. No. L-24670               14 December 1979
Santos, J.

FACTS:

Ortigas and Co. is engaged in real estate business developing and selling lots to the public.  It sold to Augusto Padilla and Natividad Angeles Lots Nos. 5 and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills Subdivision, Mandaluyong by sale on instalments.  The vendees then transferred their rights and interests over the aforesaid lots in favour of one Emma Chavez.  The agreements of sale on instalment and the deeds of sale contained the restriction that “The parcel of land subject of this deed of sale shall be used by the Buyer exclusively for residential purposes, and she shall not be entitled to take or remove soil, stones or gravel from it or any other lots belonging to the Seller.” 

Feati Bank and Trust Co. later bought said lots from Emma Chavez in the name of Republic Flour Mills.  Ortigas and Co. claims that the restrictions were imposed as part of its general building scheme designed for the beautification and development of the Highway Hills Subdivision which forms part of its big landed estate.  Feati Bank, on the other hand, maintains that the area along the western part of EDSA from Shaw Boulevard to Pasig River has been declared a commercial and industrial zone, per Resolution No. 27 s-1960 of the Municipal Council of Mandaluyong, Rizal.  Later on, Feati Bank commenced construction on the said lots for a building devoted to banking purposes.  It refused to comply with the demands of Ortigas & Co. to stop the said construction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Resolution No. 27 s-1960 can nullify or supersede the contractual obligations assumed by the defendant.

HELD:

Yes.  While non-impairment of contracts is constitutionally guaranteed, the rule is not absolute, since it has to be reconciled with the legitimate exercise of police power, i.e. “ the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety of the general welfare of the people.”  This general welfare clause shall be liberally interpreted in case of doubt, so as to give more power to local governments in promoting the economic conditions, social welfare and material progress of the people in the community.  The only exceptions under Section 12 of the Local Autonomy Act (R.A. 2264) are existing vested rights arising out of a contract between a province, city or municipality on one hand and a third party on the other hand.  Said case is not present in this petition. 

Resolution No. 27 s-1960 declaring the western part of EDSA as an industrial and commercial zone was passed in the exercise of police power to safeguard or promote the health, safety, peace, good order and general welfare of the people in the locality. 

Case Digest: SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO


SURIGAO ELECTRIC CO., INC. and ARTURO LUMANLAN, SR. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO and PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

No. L-22766        30 August 1968

Fernando, J.

FACTS:

On June 1960, Congress amended the Public Service Act, one of the changes introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service Commission for public services owned and operated by government entities or government-owned or controlled corporations, but at the same time affirming its power of regulation for the fixing of rates.  The petitioners challenged the validity of the said order.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public convenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission.

HELD:

No.

The Supreme Court held in a previous case that governmental affairs do not lose their government character by being delegated to the municipal governments.  Whatever privilege may be claimed by the petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal of the Congress.