Wednesday, March 14, 2012

Case Digest: PRIMA PARTOSA-JO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HO HANG

G.R. No. 82606     18 December 1992

CRUZ, J.

FACTS:

Jose Jo, herein respondent, admits to having cohabited with three different women and fathered fifteen children.  The first of these women, Prima Partosa, claims to be his legal wife by who he begot a daughter, Monina Jo.  The petitioner filed a complaint against Jose for judicial separation of conjugal property to which the RTC of Negros Occidental ruled in favour of Prima as regards to support but none is mentioned in the dispositive portion of its decision regarding the judicial separation of conjugal property.  Upon elevation, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the separation of conjugal property sought was allowed under Articles 175, 178, 191 of the Civil Code
  2. Whether or not there is such a separation decreed by the trial court  in the dispositive portion of its decision
HELD:

  1. YES, THE SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY IS ALLOWED UNDER THE SAID ARTICLES.
The record shows that as early as 1942, the private respondent had already rejected the petitioner, whom he denied admission to their conjugal home in Dumaguete City when she returned from Zamboanguita.  The fact that she was not accepted by Jose demonstrates all too clearly that he had no intention of resuming their conjugal relationship.  Furthermore, Jose refused to provide financial support to the petitioner.

  1. YES, THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION OF THE DECISION IN QUESTION WAS INCOMPLETE INSOFAR AS IT CARRIED NO RULING ON THE COMPLAINT FOR JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF CONJUGAL PROPERTY.
However, the technicality invoked in this case should not be allowed to prevail over considerations of substantive justice.  The trial court made definite findings that the Jose and Prima were legally married and that the properties mentioned by Prima were acquired by Jose during their married although they were registered in the name of an apparent dummy.  As there is no question that the trial court’s decision is based on the said facts, the Supreme Court then modified the decision to grant the prayer of the plaintiff on the conjugal property’s division between the spouses.

Tuesday, March 13, 2012

Case Digest: Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino de la Cruz

No. L-19565          30 January 1968
Castro, J.


FACTS:

On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino married in Bacolod City.  During their union, six (6) children were born, and seven (7) parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and three (3) parcels of land from Silay Cadastre were acquired.  These lands were assessed at P45,429 and P43,580, respectively.  The hacienda in Silay had a net profit of P3,309.49 in 1957.  Aside from these properties, the spouses also owned a number of varied businesses and subdivisions.

On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint alleging that her husband had not only abandoned her, but also mismanaged their conjugal partnership properties.  According to Estrella, since 1955, Severino had not lived in their conjugal home, but instead had lived in his office and thereafter had been living in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.  This was supported by notes and letters written by Nenita which Estrella found hidden in the pocket of her husband’s polo shirt and then in his iron safe thereafter.  When confronted, Severino denied of abandoning his wife and children.  He reasoned that he was only living in his office to teach a lesson to his quarrelsome and extremely jealous wife.  He further averred that he never failed to give his family financial support as evidenced by the allowance drawings of the wife in the amounts ranging from P1000 to P1500 from the office, which was corroborated by Marcos Ganaban, the assistant general manager of Philippine Textboard Factory. 

Furthermore, Estrella insists that her husband refused and failed to inform her of the status of their various business concerns.  She further claims that such actuations are tantamount to an abuse of administrative powers over the conjugal partnership properties.  However, no evidence from the plaintiff was presented.

ISSUES:

  1. Whether or not the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff constitute abandonment in law and would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?
  2. Whether the defendant’s failure and/or refusal to inform the plaintiff of the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of matrimonial assets?
HELD:

  1. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABANDONMENT. 
The Court held that the plaintiff’s prayer that her plea for separation of conjugal partnership properties under Articles 167 and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a presentment of real abandonment and not mere separation.  The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion.  Physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term “abandonment”, if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife.  The Court further believed that the defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children permanently despite his absence from the conjugal home, as shown by the evidence on record that he continued to give support to his family.  Furthermore, the evidence on record fails to preponderate in favour as to whether Severino kept Nenita as a concubine.  Credible evidence is needed, which the plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by her testimony that she had not seen Nenita’s handwriting before.

  1. NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF ABUSING HIS POWERS OF ADMINISTRATION OVER THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP PROPERTIES.
There is no evidence on the record to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets.  The refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute in abuse.  

Monday, March 12, 2012

Case Digest: Gaudencio Demaisip v. The Court of Appeals

25 September 1959 :: G.R. No. L-13000

FACTS:

The late Geronimo Destacamento filed his application for a fishpond permit on 01 April 1927.  Before his death, Destacamento, without the knowledge and consent of the Director of Forestry, executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in gavor of Seragin Villanueva – an act which was illegal and contrary to the rules of the permit granted him.  Nevertheless, the Director of Forestry requested Villanueva to apply for a fishpond permit over the same lots, but the latter neglected and failed to do so. 

Gaudencio Demaisip then filed with the Fish and Game Administration a fishpond permit application for the same lots.  He complied with all the prerequisites necessary for the issuance of a fishpond permit, namely, payment of annual rental of P21 and posting a surety bond in the sum of P350.  When said fishpond permit was ready to be issued to Demaisip, Villanueva executed a deed of sale covering the lots in question in favour of Luis Buenaflor who started to occupy the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a big dam.
The Director of Fish and Game Administration decided that Demaisip be given due course upon payment of an additional rental of P16 which is 1% of the value of improvements assessed at P1,600.  However, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reversed the said decision.  Demaisip then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction over the said case, due to the fact that Demaisip had not exhausted all administrative remedies before approaching the judiciary.

HELD:

It is true that plaintiff did not appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agreculture and Natural Resources to the President, but such failure cannot preclude the plaintiff from taking court action in view of the theory that the Secretary of a department is merely an alter-ego of the President.  The presumption is that the action of the Secretary bears the implied sanction of the President, unless disapproved by the latter.  It is therefore incorrect to say that plaintiff’s action should not be entertained.

Furthermore, it cannot be said that there is interference of the courts with the acts of executive officers for such defense might only be valid in special civil actions – this is not one – wherein the petitioner must allege and prove that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy.

Case Digest: JOSE UY and his Spouse GLENDA J. UY and GILDA L. JARDELEZA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO L. JARDELEZA

G.R. No. 109557   29 November 2000
PARDO, J.

FACTS:

On 25 March 1991, Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. suffered from a stroke which left him comatose and bereft of any motor or mental faculties.  He is the father of herein respondent Teodoro Jardeleza and the husband of herein petitioner Gilda Jardeleza.  Gilda signified to the court her desire to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties and also alleged that her husband’s medical treatment and hospitalization expenses are piling up.  For this, she urgently needed to sell one piece of real property, specifically Lot No. 4291 and its improvements.  Said incapacity of Ernesto Sr. was affirmed by the RTC of Iloilo City, and Gilda was authorized to assume sole powers of administration of their conjugal properties pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code.

Teodoro Jardeleza filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgement and questioned the property sale of Lot No. 4291, stating that the market value of the property would be around 12 to 15 million pesos, but had been sold to Gilda’s daughter, Glenda Uy for only 8 million pesos.  He also pointed out that the building thereon which houses the Jardeleza Clinic is a monument to his father’s industry, labor and service, and further argues that the conjugal partnership had other liquid assets to pay off all financial obligations in the form of cash and stocks which can off-set against the cost of medical and hospital bills.  Furthermore, Ernesto Sr. enjoys certain privileges at the said hospital which allows him to pay on instalment basis and that his two attending physicians are his own sons who do not charge anything for their professional services.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner Gilda Jardeleza as the wife of Ernesto Jardeleza, Sr. who suffered a stroke, rendering him comatose, could manage their conjugal property and may assume sole powers of administration of the conjugal property under Article 124 of the Family Code and dispose a parcel of land with its improvements to her own daughter and son-in-law.

HELD:

The proceedings under Article 124 of the Family Code contemplate a situation where the spouse is absent, or separated in fact or has abandoned the other or consent is withheld or cannot be obtained.  These rules do not apply in cases where the spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent.  A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe the procedure of the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under the Revised Rules of Court. 

In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.  Absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial court is void for lack of due process. A decision rendered without due process is void ab initio.  A decision is void for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the opportunity to be heard.

Case Digest: VICTOR JUANIZA, Heirs of Josefa P. Leus, etc., et al. vs. EUGENIO JOSE, THE ECONOMIC INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. and ROSALIA ARROYO

Nos. L-50127-28 :: 30 March 1979 :: De Castro, J.

FACTS:

Eugenio Jose was a registered owner and operator of a passenger jeepney involved in a collision with a freight train of the Philippine National Railways which resulted in the death of seven (7) of its passengers and physical injuries to five (5).  At the time of the accident, Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen (16) years.  The CFI of Laguna held that Arroyo and Jose were jointly and severally liable for the damages in the said accident.

ISSUE:  Whether or not Arroyo may be held jointly and severally liable for damages with Jose, her common-law husband.

HELD:

NO, ARROYO CANNOT BE HELD LIABLE FOR THE DAMAGES IMPUTED ON JOSE.

For her to be held liable under the law, it is required that her cohabitation with Jose be free from any legal impediment.  As she is not the registered owner of the jeepney and since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage, thus Rosalia Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney.  The jeepney belongs to the conjugal partnership between Jose and Ramos.