Friday, December 30, 2011

Case Digest: Johnson & Johnson (Phils.) Inc. vs. Court Of Appeals And Alejo M. Vinluan

G.R. No. 102692   23 September 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

On several occasions in 1982, the defendant, Delilah Vinluan, purchased products of Johnson & Johnson, as she was also engaged in the business of retailing Johnson products, among others.  The defendants, under the name and style of “Vinluan Enterprises,” thus incurred an obligation of P235,880.89 for which she issued seven Philippine Banking Corporation checks of varying amounts and due dates.  However, the checks were dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds.  Several extensions were given to the spouses to settle the obligation.  On 05 January 1983, the defendant spouses made a partial payment of P5,000.00, but made no further payments afterwards.  The trial court found that Alejo Vinluan, had no privity of contract, whether direct or indirect, regarding those obligations incurred by his wife, as he only became a co-owner of Vinluan Enterprises after the obligations involved in this action had been incurred by Delilah.  In addition, said obligations were contracted without the husband’s knowledge or consent, and that the conjugal partnership never derived benefit therefrom.

The trial court decided that Alejo should not be held liable for the obligations incurred by his wife without his knowledge or consent.  However, when notices of levy on execution were issued, these covered not only Delilah’s exclusive or paraphernal properties, but also the real and personal properties of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Vinluan. This has caused Alejo to file a third-party claim, which was denied by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the order of the trial court denying private respondent’s third-party claim and motion to quash levy on execution in effect amended the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision which had long become final and executory.

HELD:

NO, THE TRIAL COURT CANNOT, IN THE GUISE OF DECIDING THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIM, REVERSE ITS FINAL DECISION.

In order to bind the conjugal partnership and its properties, the law provides that the debts and obligations contracted must be for the benefit of the conjugal partnership; and that the husband must consent to his wife’s engaging in business.  The text of the trial court’s decision points to no other person liable but Delilah Vinluan, and in fact made a rather lengthy discussion on the exemption from liability of the conjugal partnership; hence, there can be no ambiguity to speak of in the decision.  And even more clearly, the body of the decision of the trial court expressly exempted private respondent from liability by categorically ruling that “the defendant-husband cannot, together, with the co-defendant legally be made liable for the obligations contracted by the wife.”

Case Digest: Consolacion Villanueva vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, Jesus Bernas And Remedios Q. Bernas

G.R. No. 74577                     04 December 1990
NARVASA, J.

FACTS:

Modesto and Frederico Aranas inherited Lot 13 from their parents, Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa.  Said lot was divided into a northern and southern portion (Lot 13-C) and was distributed between Frederico and Modesto, respectively. Modesto had two illegitimate children names Dorothea Aranas Ado and Teodoro C. Aranas.  These two loaned from Jeusu Bernas an amount of P18,000.00 secured by Lot 13-C.  A Loan Agreement with Real Estate Mortgage was executed between the siblings and Bernas wherein they described themselves as absolute co-owners of Lot 13.  Raymundo Aranas and Consolacion Villanueva signed the document as witnesses.

About a month later, Villanueva and Aranas filed a complaint against Bernas alleging that they be declared co-owners of the land based on the will of Victoria Comorro bequeathing to Villanueva and Aranas all of Comorro’s “interests, rights and properties, real and personal, x x as her net share from the conjugal partnership property with her husband, Modesto Aranas x x.”  Modesto Aranas’ will, on the other hand, bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro all his interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria “as well as his own capital property brought by him to his marriage with his said wife.”

ISSUES:

Whether or not Consolacion Villanueva has any right over Lot 13-C and the improvements thereon standing by virtue of Victoria Camorro’s last will and testament.

HELD:

NO, CONSOLACION VILLANUEVA DOES NOT BEAR ANY RIGHT OVER LOT 13-C AND THE IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.

Lot 13-C was not part of the conjugal partnership property of Comorro and Aranas.  It was the latter’s exclusive, private property, which he had inherited from his parents and registered solely in his name.  It is inconsequential whether he acquired the property subsequent to his marriage to Comorroo for Article 148 of the Civil Code decrees that to be considered “the exclusive property of the spouse” is inter alia, “that which is brought to the marriage as his or her own,” or “that which each acquires, during the marriage, by lucrative title.  Such is the case in Modesto’s acquisition of Lot 13-C.  Furthermore, the fact that Comorro died 2 years ahead of Aranas clearly signifies that she never inherited anything from her husband.

To claim for the improvements thereon, proof is needful of the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used therefor in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately.  No such proof was presented by Villanueva.

Wednesday, December 28, 2011

Case Digest: JOSEFINA FRANCISCO vs. MASTER IRON WORKS & CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and ROBERTO ALEJO

G.R. No. 151967  ::  16 February 2005  ::  Callejo, Sr., J.

Facts:

Josefina Castillo, married to Eduardo Francisco, bought two parcels of residential land and a house thereon.  The Register of Deeds issued TCTs in the name of “Josefina Castillo Francisco married to Eduardo G. Francisco.”  Eduardo had written an Affidavit of Waiver stating that before his marriage to Josefina, the latter purchased two parcels of land, including the house constructed thereon, with her own savings and that he was waiving whatever claims he had over the property.  The property was mortgaged to Leonila Cando with marital conformity of Eduardo.

When Eduardo failed to pay for the 7,500 bags of cement worth P768,750.00 from Master Iron Works, the court issued a writ of execution levying the two parcels of land owned by Josefina.  Before Josefina could commence presenting her evidence against MIWCC, Josefina filed a petition to annul her marriage to Eduardo on the ground that the latter had a subsisting marriage to one Carmelita Carpio when the two were married.  Said annulment was granted by the RTC.

Issue:  
Whether or not the subject properties were paraphernal property of Josefina and can not be held liable for the Eduardo’s personal obligations.

Held:

NO, THE PROPERTIES ARE NOT THE PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY OF JOSEFINA AND CAN BE HELD TO ANSWER FOR EDUARDO’S OBLIGATIONS.

Although it is true that the properties cannot be held as conjugal for the cohabitation between Eduardo and Josefina are bigamous, the latter failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of the subject property and hence, is not a co-owner of such.  Also, the Court doubted that when she acquired the property at 23 years of age, she had enough funds to pay for it.  Her claim that the funds for the property were provided by her mother and sister, the Court believed, was just an afterthought.

Case Digest: REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG vs. COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING

G.R. No. 115460  :: 15 March 1995  :: MELO, J.

Facts:

Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met in Iligan City.  Teresita left for Los Angeles to work as a nurse where she was able to acquire immigrant status sometime later.  Reynaldo was sent by his employer to Pittsburgh as its liaison officer.  Reynaldo and Teresita began to maintain a common-law relationship of husband and wife where a child was born, Rosalind Therese.  During their vacation in the Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married and by the time they returned to the United States, Reginald Vince was born.  The relationship soon deteriorated and Teresita left her family to go back to California.  Because his assignment is not yet completed, Reynaldo had to leave his children with his sister, Guillerma Layug, in the Philippines.

Results of child psychology tests on Rosalind when she was five years old show that the child experiences great anxiety at the thought of having to go back to the U.S. to live with her mother.  She even stated in one of these tests that she saw her mother kissing a “bad” man who worked for her father.  Both children are now over seven years of age and prefer to stay with their father and aunt.

Issue:  Whether or not custody of the children should be awarded to the mother.

Held:

NO, AS BOTH CHILDREN ARE NOW OVER SEVEN YEARS OF AGE, THEIR CHOICE OF PARENT SHOULD BE GIVEN RESPECT BY THE COURT.

The rule that a child below seven years of age should not be separated from the mother, unless there are compelling reasons is not applicable in this case anymore.  As the children can now ascertain what is right and moral, the court should give due respect to their decision to stay with their father and aunt in the Philippines.  Furthermore, a mother’s constant flirtations from one man to another is considered by the court as a compelling reason not to award the children’s custody to her, for said behaviour forms an immoral environment especially to a growing child.  From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting two requirements found in Article 213(1) of the Family Code.