Reviewer: Justifying Circumstances

Sharing another reviewer.  This time it's on Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code on Justifying
Circumstances.


You can download it HERE.

Hard-to-Find Case (Full Text): Ang Tek Lian vs. Court of Appeals

1950 September 25                                                                            En Banc

G.R. No. L-2516                                                                    D E C I S I O N


BENGZON, J.:

For having issued a rubber check, Ang Tek Lian was convicted of estafa in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict.

It appears that, knowing he had no funds therefor, Ang Tek Lian drew on Saturday, November 16, 1946, the check Exhibit A upon the China Banking Corporation for the sum of P4,000, payable to the order of "cash". He delivered it to Lee Hua Hong in exchange for money which the latter handed in the act. On November 18, 1946, the next business day, the check was presented by Lee Hua Hong to the drawee bank for payment, but it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, the balance of the deposit of Ang Tek Lian on both dates being P335 only.

The Court of Appeals believed the version of Lee Huan Hong who testified that "on November 16, 1946, appellant went to his (complainant's) office, at 1217 Herran, Paco, Manila, and asked him to exchange Exhibit A - which he (appellant) then brought with him - with cash alleging that he needed badly the sum of P4,000 represented by the check, but could not withdraw it from the bank, it being then already closed; that in view of this request and relying upon appellant's assurance that he had sufficient funds in the bank to meet Exhibit A, and because they used to borrow money from each other, even before the war, and appellant owns a hotel and restaurant known as the North Bay Hotel, said complainant delivered to him, on the same date, the sum of P4,000 in cash; that despite repeated efforts to notify him that the check had been dishonored by the bank, appellant could not be located any-where, until he was summoned in the City Fiscal's Office in view of the complaint for estafa filed in connection therewith; and that appellant has not paid as yet the amount of the check, or any part thereof."

Inasmuch as the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final, the only question of law for decision is whether under the facts found, estafa had been accomplished.

Article 315, paragraph (d), subsection 2 of the Revised Penal Code, punishes swindling committed "By post-dating a check, or issuing such check in payment of an obligation the offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by him in the bank were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check, and without informing the payee of such circumstances."

We believe that under this provision of law Ang Tek Lian was properly held liable. In this connection, it must be stated that, as explained in People vs. Fernandez (59 Phil., 615), estafa is committed by issuing either a postdated check or an ordinary check to accomplish the deceit.

It is argued, however, that as the check had been made payable to "cash" and had not been endorsed by Ang Tek Lian, the defendant is not guilty of the offense charged. Based on the proposition that "by uniform practice of all banks in the Philippines a check so drawn is invariably dishonored," the following line of reasoning is advanced in support of the argument:

". . . When, therefore, he (the offended party) accepted the check (Exhibit A) from the appellant, he did so with full knowledge that it would be dishonored upon presentment. In that sense, the appellant could not be said to have acted fraudulently because the complainant, in so accepting the check as it was drawn, must be considered, by every rational consideration, to have done so fully aware of the risk he was running thereby." (Brief for the appellant, p. 11.)

We are not aware of the uniformity of such practice. Instances have undoubtedly occurred wherein the Bank required the indorsement of the drawer before honoring a check payable to "cash." But cases there are too, where no such requirement had been made. It depends upon the circumstances of each transaction.

Under the Negotiable Instruments Law (sec. 9 [d], a check drawn payable to the order of "cash" is a check payable to bearer, and the bank may pay it to the person presenting it for payment without the drawer's indorsement.

"A check payable to the order of cash is a bearer instrument. Bacal vs. National City Bank of New York (1933), 146 Misc., 732; 262 N. Y. S., 839; Cleary vs. Da Beck Plate Glass Co. (1907), 54 Misc., 537; 104 N. Y. S., 831; Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. vs. Pittsburgh Pipe & Supply Co. (Tex. Civ. App., 1939), 135 S. W. (2d), 818. See also H. Cook & Son vs. Moody (1916), 17 Ga. App., 465; 87 S. E., 713."

"Where a check is made payable to the order of 'cash', the word cash 'does not purport to be the name of any person', and hence the instrument is payable to bearer. The drawee bank need not obtain any indorsement of the check, but may pay it to the person presenting it without any indorsement. . . ." (Zollmann, Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 6, p. 494.)

Of course, if the bank is not sure of the bearer's identity or financial solvency, it has the right to demand identification and/or assurance against possible complications, - for instance, (a) forgery of drawer's signature, (b) loss of the check by the rightful owner, (c) raising of the amount payable, etc. The bank may therefore require, for its protection, that the indorsement of the drawer - or of some other person known to it - be obtained. But where the Bank is satisfied of the identity and/or the economic standing of the bearer who tenders the check for collection, it will pay the instrument without further question; and it would incur no liability to the drawer in thus acting.

"A check payable to bearer is authority for payment to the holder. Where a check is in the ordinary form, and is payable to bearer, so that no indorsement is required, a bank, to which it is presented for payment, need not have the holder identified, and is not negligent in failing to do so. . . ." (Michie on Banks and Banking, Permanent Edition, Vol. 5, p. 343.)

". . . Consequently, a drawee bank to which a bearer check is presented for payment need not necessarily have the holder identified and ordinarily may not be charged with negligence in failing to do so. See Opinions 6C:2 and 6C:3. If the bank has no reasonable cause for suspecting any irregularity, it will be protected in paying a bearer check, 'no matter what facts unknown to it may have occurred prior to the presentment.' 1 Morse, Banks and Banking, sec. 393.

"Although a bank is entitled to pay the amount of a bearer check without further inquiry, it is entirely reasonable for the bank to insist that the holder give satisfactory proof of his identity . . .." (Paton's Digest, Vol. I, p. 1089.)

Anyway, it is significant, and conclusive, that the form of the check Exhibit A was totally unconnected with its dishonor. The Court of Appeals declared that it was returned unsatisfied because the drawer had insufficient funds - not because the drawer's indorsement was lacking.

Wherefore, there being no question as to the correctness of the penalty imposed on the appellant, the writ of certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Pablo, Tuason, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Case Digest: Professor Randolf S. David, et. al. vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, et. al.

G.R. No. 171396                03 May 2006                              Ponente: Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.

OVERVIEW:

This is a case of seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition alleging that in issuing Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 and General Order No. 5, President Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP1017 declaring a State of National Emergency invoking Section 18, Article 7 of the 1987 Constitution. On the same day, she also issued GO no. 5 AFP and PNP to immediately carry out appropriate actions to suppress and prevent the lawless violence by invoking Section 4, Article 2 of the same.  She did so citing the following bases:

• The elements of the elements of the Extreme Left (NDF-CPP-NPA) and Extreme Right are now in alliance threatening to bring down the President;
• Being magnified by the media, said acts are adversely affecting the economy thus representing clear and present danger to the safety and integrity of the State

A week later, the President lifted PP1017 via PP1021.  It must be noted that before the said proclamations, the following course of events ensued:

• February 17, 2006 : authorities got hold of a document entitled “Oplan Hackle I” detailing the plans for bombing more particularly that which was to occur in the PMA Homecoming in Baguio City which the President was to attend.
• February 21, 2006 : Lt. San Juan recaptured a communist safehouse where 2 flash disks containing information that “Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20^th Anniversary of Edsa I.”
• February 23, 2006 : PNP Chief Lomibao intercepted information that members of the PNP-SAF were planning to defect.  Also, it was discovered that B/Gen. Danilo Lim and Col. Ariel Querubin were plotting to break the AFP chain of command for a movement against the Arroyo administration.  The two were later taken into custody by Gen. Senga.  However, statements were being released from the CPP-NPA and NDF on the increasing number of anti-Arroyo groups within the police and military.
• The bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan.

The effects of PP1017 and GO No. 5 are as follows:

• Protest by the KMU, NAFLU-KMU despite the cancellation of programs and activities for the 20^th celebration of Edsa I as well as revocation of rally permits resulting in the violent disposal of the said groups and warrantless arrest of petitioner Randolf David and Ronald Llamas.
• Raid of the Daily Tribune, Malaya and Abante offices and confiscation of news stories and various documents
• Arrest of Congressman Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis Party) by the police showing a 1985 warrant from the Marcos regime and attempts on the arrest of Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, et. al.

The petitioners assail that various rights stated in Article III of the 1987 Constitution have been violated, thus the case at hand.

ISSUES:

1. Whether PP 1021 in lifting PP 1017 renders the petitions moot and academic;
2. Whether the Court may review the factual bases of PP1017 on the petitioners’ contention that the said proclamation has none of it;
3. Whether PP 1017 and GO no. 5 are unconstitutional for their insofar as it allegedly violates the right of the people against unreasonable search and seizures, the right against warrantless arrest, the freedom of speech, of expression, of the press, and to peaceably assemble.

HELD:

1. The court held that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.  During the eight days that PP 1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts implementing it.  There is no question that the issues being raised affect the public’s interest involving as they do the people’s basic rights to freedom of expression, of assembly and of the press.  An otherwise moot case may still be decided “provided that the party raising it continues to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of its issuance” (Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary) which is applicable in the present case.
2. Yes, the Court may do so.  As to how the Court may inquire into the President’s exercise of power, it must be proven that the President did not act arbitrarily.  It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual basis as the Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. This, however, was something that the petitioners failed to prove.
3. Since there is no law defining “acts of terrorism,” it is President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5 who has the discretion to determine what acts constitute terrorism, without restrictions.  Certainly, the effects which may be implicated by such violate the due process clause of the Constitution.  Thus, the “acts of terrorism portion of G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.  The plain import of the language of the Constitution provides that searches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable without a search warrant or warrant of arrest.  A warrantless arrest shall only be done if the offense is committed in one’s presence or it has just been committed based on personal knowledge – both of which are not present in David’s warrantless arrest.  This being done during the dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU, et. al. is also violative of the right of the people to peaceably assemble.  The wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle that “freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent.”  Revocation of such permits may only be done after due notice and hearing.   In the Daily Tribune case, the search and seizure of materials for publication, the stationing of policemen in the vicinity of The Daily Tribune offices, and the arrogant warning of government officials to media are plain censorship.  It is that officious functionary of the repressive government who tells the citizen that he may speak only if allowed to do so, and no more.  When in implementing its provisions, pursuant to G.O. No. 5, the military and the police committed acts which violate the citizens’ rights under the Constitution, the Court has to declare such acts unconstitutional and illegal.

Audio Codal: Negotiable Instruments Law Part 1

For all you auditory learners over there! Just click on the download links.


Negotiable Instruments Law : Sections 1 to 10


Negotiable Instruments Law : Sections 11-23




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Case Digest: People of the Philippines vs. Ruben Corpuz y Simon

G.R. No. 175836                30 January 2009

FACTS:

For several months, the victim, a minor below 18 years of age, had been raped multiple times by herein appellant who is the live-in partner of the victim’s mother.  He would do so with threats that he would kill the victim and her mother if she would not succumb to his desires.  The victim kept the incidents to herself until she noticed that her menstruation stopped, fearing pregnancy.  It was found through examinations that the victim had old hymenal lacerations.  The appellant admitted to having sexual intercourse with the victim, but claimed that he never used force.

ISSUE:

Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship is to be appreciated in favour of the victim in order to qualify said offense from simple rape to qualified rape.

RULING:

To obtain qualified rape, the minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must be both alleged in the Information and proved with certainty.  Minority had been alleged and proved.  The stepfather-stepdaughter relationship as a qualifying circumstance presupposes that the victim’s mother and the accused contracted marriage.  The prosecution, however, did not present proof to support this.  What appellant claimed is that he and the victim’s mother were merely common-law spouses, which would also qualify the offense.  Since no proof on the relationship was alleged in the Information, simple rape cannot be qualified.  Therefore, it was held that appellant committed six counts of simple rape with the penalty of reclusion perpetua.