Case Digest: Bengzon vs. Drilon

G.R. No. 103524                15 April 1992

FACTS:

The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving monthly pensions under R.A. No. 910 as amended by R.A. No. 1797.  Section 3-A, which authorizes said pensions, of R.A. No. 1797 was repealed by President Marcos.  The legislature saw the need to re-enact said R.A.s to restore said retirement pensions and privilege.  President Aquino, however, vetoed House Bill No. 16297 as well as portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 of the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (GAA of FY 1992).

ISSUES:

1. 1.       Whether the President may veto certain provisions of the General Appropriatons Act; and
2. 2.       Whether the questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed to the Judiciary

RULING:

1. 1.       The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power.  But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise.  The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.  It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the “item veto power” to avoid inexpedient riders from being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.  What was done by the President was the vetoing of a provision and not an item.
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3. 2.       Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution provides for the Fiscal Autonomy of the Judiciary.  The veto of the specific provisions in the GAA is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy.  The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the judiciary is withheld.  Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in law.  It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints.  The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed, which is provided for in Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution.

Case Digest: Ichong, et. al. vs. Hernandez, etc. and Sarmiento

FACTS:

R.A. No. 1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed that nationalizes the retail trade business by prohibiting against persons not citizens of the Philippines, as well as associations, partnerships or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of U.S. citizens and juridical entities.  Aliens are required to present registration to the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; and
2. Whether the provisions of the Act violates the due process of law

RULING:

1. There is no merit in this contention.  The UN Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations.  The Treaty of Amity between China and the Philippines guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals “upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country,” and is therefore not violated for all nationals except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
2. A cursory study of the provisions of the law show that it is reasonable as it is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives.  Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a violation of due process, is not in its reasonableness but its unreasonableness and the Court found that these provisions are not unreasonable.

Case Digest: Jose A. Angara vs. The Electoral Commission, et. al.

FACTS:

In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas.  The petitioner was proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in office.  A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner.  The petitioner countered this with a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy; and
2. Whether the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed over the election of herein petitioner.

RULING:

1. The National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its members is essential to the conclusion of treaties.  Furthermore, its power to determine what courts other than the Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent.  The Assembly also exercises the judicial power of trying impeachments.  The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.  This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.
2. Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that “x x x The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” In view of the deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua.  The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

Case Digest: Brillantes, Jr. vs. Yorac

G.R. No. 93867                  18 December 1990           Ponente: Cruz, J.

FACTS:

The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC, in place of Chariman Davide.  The petitioner argues that the choice of the Acting Chairman is an internal matter to the COMELEC.  It is also averred that the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates the independence of the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether the designation done by the President of the Philippines violates Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution.

RULING:

Article IX-A, Section 1 of the Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as “independent.”  Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions.  Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by the Court as provided by the Constitution in Article IX-A, Section 7.  The choice of temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion.  That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President.   The designation by the President of respondent Yorac as Acting Chairman of the COMELEC is declared unconstitutional.