Case Digest: Celestino Marturillas vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 163217                18 April 2006

FACTS:

On 04 November 1998, after Lito Santos had served his wife Cecilia and Artemio Pantinople with lunch, Artemio returned to his store which was five (5) meters away from Santos’ house.  At about 7:30 in the evening, Santos was eating lunch in his house when he heard a gunshot.  Artemio had been shot on the chest.  He shouted at Santos “Tabangi ko Pre, gipusil ko ni kapitan.” (Help me, Pre, I was shot by the captain.)  Lito saw a man running away from the direction of Artemio’s store, but he wasn’t able to see his face.  Artemio’s wife, Ernita, came running from her house to her husband’s side upon seeing him sprawled on the ground and bloodied.  She had left her infant lying on the kitchen floor in surprise.  Ernita shouted several times, “Kapitan, ngano nimo gipatay ang akong bana.” (Captain, why did you shoot my husband?)

Barangay Captain Celestino Marturillas was invited by a couple of police officers to the police station upon informing that he was the principal suspect in the slaying of Artemio Pantinople.  He also took with him his government-issued M-14 Rifle and one magazine of live M-14 ammunition, and turned over the same to the Bunawan PNP.  To his defense, he claimed that he was asleep in his home which was 250 meters away from Artemio’s store.  Further, he is said to have just risen from bed when two Barangay Kagawads wanted to see him because of the shooting incident. He even tried to approach Artemio’s family, but he could not do so because they had turned belligerent at his presence. 

During the trial of the case, Ernita positively identified Marturillas as her husband’s assailant.  This positive identification is corroborated by Santos’ testimony and expert witness Dr. Danilo Ledesma, a medico-legal officer for Davao City, that the gunshot wound in Artemio’s body had been caused by a bullet that is of the same size as that fired from an M-14 Rifle.  However, the same expert witness testified that Marturillas’ hands do not contain gunpowder nitrates.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution’s evidence is credible and enough to convict Marturillas of homicide.

RULING:

Ernita positively identified Marturillas as the one “running away” immediately after the sound of a gunshot.  Certain that she had seen him, she even described what he was wearing, the firearm he was carrying, and the direction towards which he was running.  She also clarified that she had heard the statement, “help me pre, I was shot by the captain.”  The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the RTC and the CA that Ernita’s testimony is credible because the spot where Artemio was shot was only 30 meters away from her house.  The identification of a person can be established through familiarity with one’s physical features.  Once a person has gained familiarity with one another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance.  Judicial notice can also be taken of the fact that people in rural communities generally know each other both by face and name, and can be expected to know each other’s distinct and particular features and characteristics.  Settled is the rule that on questions of credibility of witnesses and veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect.

It should be clear that Santos never testified that petitioner was the one who had actually shot the victim. Still, the testimony of this witness is valuable, because it validates the statements made by Ernita.  He confirms that after hearing the gunshot, he saw the victim and heard the latter cry out those same words.

Moreover, the statement of the victim is considered by the Court as both a dying declaration and res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of res gestae.  Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants of the victims of, or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its commission.  These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for the declarant to fabricate a false statement.  All the requisites of res gestae are present in this case: 

1.) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; 

2.) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and 

3.) the statements concerned the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.  

Both the statements of the victim and Ernita can be considered res gestae.

Case Digest: Antonio Lejano vs. People of the Philippines

 G.R. No. 176389                14 December 2010

FACTS:

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in Paranaque City.  Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime.  It presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the crime.  She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits.  She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact.  Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals.  Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the “darling” of the NBI because of her contribution to its success.  The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaro’s direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.

In Alfaro’s story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence.  After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela.  Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the United States.  He had apparently left for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992.  As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the Philippines and the US, Flight’s Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA.  Aside from these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US

ISSUE:

Whether or not Webb’s documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.

RULING:

For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria:

1. The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; and
2. The witness’ story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria.  She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.  She had been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on them.  And although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the case.  She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.

To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that:

1. He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb.  This alibi altogether impeaches Alfaro’s testimony not only with respect to him, but also with respect to the other accused.  For, if the Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when the crime took place, Alfaro’s testimony will not hold altogether.  Webb’s participation is the anchor of Alfaro’s story.

Case Digest: Radin C. Alcira vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 149859                09 June 2004

FACTS:

Middleby Philippines Corporation (Middleby) hired Alcira as engineering support services supervisor on a probationary basis for six months.  According to Alcira’s papers, he was hired 20 May 1996; while Middleby presents papers stating that the correct date should be 27 May 1996. Both documents indicated that Alcira was on probationary and a remark that after five months, his performance will be evaluated.  On 20 November 1996, a senior officer allegedly withheld Alcira’s time card and considered this as a dismissal after the lapse of his probationary employment.  Middleby averred that Alcira exhibited poor performance, incurred ten absences, was late several times and violated company policy regarding the wearing of uniform.

LA dismissed the complaint on the ground that Middleby were able to prove that petitioner was apprised of the standards for becoming a regular employee.  NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.  CA also affirmed the decision of the NLRC, stating further that there was merely an expiration of the contract and no termination is there to speak of.

ISSUE:

Whether petitioner was allowed to work beyond his probationary period as was therefore already a regular employee at the time of his alleged dismissal.

HELD:

Yes.  The petitioner was still in his probationary period.  To be clear, the five-month period in his contract is for evaluation purposes only.  It is clear upon the fact of the contract that his probationary employment status was for six months.  Moreover, the computation of the six-month probationary period is reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the six-month following.  In short, since the number of days in each particular month was irrelevant, the petitioner was still a probationary employee when Middleby opted not to regularize him on 20 November 1996. 

In lieu with Section 6(d) of Rule 1 of D.O. No. 10-1997, the Court held that Middleby substantially notified petitioner of the standard to qualify as a regular employee when it apprised him at the start of his employment, that it would evaluate his supervisory skills after five months.